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INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal courts of appeals, above all the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
developed the "hard look doctrine."' The doctrine found its origins in
judicial decisions requiring administrative agencies to demonstrate
that they had taken a "hard look" at the underlying questions of policy
and fact.' Hence agencies were required to offer detailed, even encyclopedic, explanations for their conclusions, to respond to counterarguments, to justify departures from past practices, and to give careful
consideration to alternatives to the proposed course of action.' These
were procedural requirements, to be sure, but they had significant effects, often shifting regulatory policy in identifiable directions by, for
example, discouraging the construction of nuclear power plants' and
generally leading agencies to give heightened attention to environmental protection.' Eventually courts went well beyond these procet Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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I For an influential and well known example, see Ethyl Corp v EPA, 541 F2d 1, 35 (DC
Cir 1976) (en banc) (stating that a court should "undertake[] a study of the record ... even as to
the evidence on technical and specialized matters").
2
See Harold Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,122 U
Pa L Rev 509,511 (1974).
3
All of these requirements can be found in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 43 (1983). In the same vein, see Corrosion
ProofFittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1212 (5th Cir 1991) (requiring the agency to give notice of its
intended methodology "while the public still has an opportunity to analyze, comment, and influence the proceedings").
4
See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv L Rev 1833, 1838-39 (1978) ("The licensing process, including court review,
would seem at least partly responsible for the long lag between plan and operation.... [O]ne
suspects that delay in the licensing process would tend to lead a firm to decide in favor of coal
[instead of building a nuclear power plant].").
5 See William E Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L J 38,
59 (1975) (arguing that the EPA may promulgate suboptimally protective regulations due to
intra-agency and external opposition, and that strong judicial review is an effective check on this
pattern). For an early and illustrative signal of the intended effect of judicial review in the environmental domain, see Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc v Atomic Energy Commis-
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dural requirements to take a hard look on their own, assessing the rea-

sonableness of agency judgments of policy and fact on their merits.!
The goal of hard look review was to police agency decisions for
genuine arbitrariness, not to allow federal judges to impose their own
policy preferences on the administrative state.7 Indeed, a central point
of judicial review was to respond to the open-ended delegation of dis-

cretionary power by ensuring a firm check on agency decisions that

might be "irrational or discriminatory."8 On this view, the hard look
doctrine might be seen as a second-best substitute for the original
constitutional safeguards against the uncontrolled exercise of discre-

tion. Judicial scrutiny of agency judgments of policy and fact might
even serve as a method for reducing factional power over government

in a way that would recall longstanding concerns about the problems
posed by the exercise of authority by self-interested private groups.
As it developed, however, the hard look doctrine became highly
controversial.0 Some of the controversy involved its likely effects. Would
the doctrine discourage agency action altogether, and therefore freeze

the status quo rather than improving agency decisions?" Some of the
controversy involved its legal foundations. Was hard look review an
illegitimate creation of the federal courts? 2 What provision of law authorized federal judges to impose these various requirements on agension, 449 F2d 1109, 1111 (DC Cir 1971) (asserting that the role of courts in judicial review is to
ensure that agencies "live up to the congressional mandate" of protecting the natural environment).
6
See, for example, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 415 (1971)
(maintaining that a presumption of regularity does not protect an agency from "a thorough,
probing, in-depth review").
7
See id at 416 (explaining that although there must be a "searching and careful" review,
the court may only determine whether the agency made a "clear error of judgment... and is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency").
8
Ethyl Corp, 541 F2d at 68 (Leventhal concurring) (arguing that judicial review ensures
that agencies promulgate objectives and regulations in a reasonable manner that is consistent
with their statutory powers).
9 See Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist 56, 59-60 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
10 See, for example, Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park. Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L Rev 1251, 1266-68
(1992) (arguing that the Court may have improperly distrusted the political process); Jerry L.
Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 96-97 (Harvard 1990) (criticizing
circuit court interpretations of the "arbitrary and capricious" and "hard look" standards for
burdening agencies and for causing uncertainty as to which issues might be "significant" at trial);
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 388-90
(1986) (arguing that judges lack the technical knowledge and independent access to information
necessary to make a well-informed judgment about agency decisions).
11 See Mashaw and Harfst, Auto Safety at 95 (cited in note 10) (describing how judicial
review invalidating agency regulations creates "massive disruption" and significant delay).
12 For discussion, see Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure:A Somewhat Different View, 91 Harv L Rev 1823, 1829 (1978) (arguing that the creation of additional procedures is an agency, not a court, determination).
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cies or to give careful scrutiny to the merits?" Independent questions
lay in the background: Would judicial biases distort the inquiry into reasonableness?" Might judicial judgments reflect not an assessment of
irrationality or discrimination, but the judges' own policy commitments?
In its seminal decision in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v State Farm Auto Mutual Insurance Co,"5 the Court entrenched
hard look review and clarified its foundations. The Court rooted its

analysis in § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act" (APA), which
requires courts to strike down agency action found to be "arbitrary"
or "capricious."" According to the Court, a decision would count as
arbitrary if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise."
These words, quoted hundreds of times in federal court decisions, 9
were widely taken to ratify both procedural and substantive components of the hard look doctrine.f
Many agency decisions, including those of the NLRB, are also subject to review as lacking "substantial evidence." In its 1951 decision in
Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 2' the Court emphasized that the substantial evidence test of the National Labor Relations Act" (NLRA)

13

This question is raised in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v NRDC, 435 US 519,

548 (1978) (finding that no statute permitted the lower court to review and overturn the rulemaking procedure if that procedure met the statutory minimum).
14 See Ethyl Corp, 541 F2d at 67 (Bazelon concurring) (warning that aggressive judicial
review will "compound the error of the panel in making legislative policy determinations alien to
its true function").
15 463 US 29 (1983).
16 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (2000).
17 ld ("The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be ...
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.").
18 State Farm, 463 US at 43.
19 In fact, these words have been quoted in no fewer than 572 federal cases as of April 23,
2007. LEXIS search,Apr 2007.
20
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-look Doctrine, 1983 S Ct Rev 177,210
(arguing that State Farm endorses the primary elements of the hard look doctrine by requiring
substantive consideration of the facts and supporting the procedural reversal of agency decisions
in order to maintain efficient regulation).
21 340 US474 (1951).
22 29 USC § 160(e) (2000) (requiring that the NLRB's factual findings be upheld "if supported by substantial evidence").
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and the APA2 was "a response to pressures for stricter and more uniform practice," embodying a legislative "mood" in favor of increased
judicial "responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor
Board decisions."' In practice, and especially in the aftermath of State
Farm, review under the substantial evidence standard is essentially the

same as review under the arbitrary and capricious standard," though it
is sometimes thought that review for substantial evidence is somewhat
more searching.26
Since State Farm, the Court has issued no major pronouncements
about judicial review of allegedly arbitrary agency action, and the doctrine has remained essentially stable for over two decades.27 But the
controversies that preceded the decision have continued unabated.
23 5 USC § 706(2)(E) (2000) (stipulating that certain agency actions and findings shall be
set aside if "unsupported by substantial evidence").
24
Universal Camera,340 US at 487,489-90 (exploring that mood).
25 For the substantial evidence test, see Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc v NLRB, 522
US 359, 366-67 (1998) (applying the substantial evidence standard and inquiring whether a
reasonable jury could have come to the same conclusion as the NLRB); Universal Camera, 340
US at 481 (elaborating that standard). Some provisions of the environmental statutes also call
for substantial evidence review.
The claim that there is no difference between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary
and capricious standard is supported by the fact that the legislative history of the statute in State
Farm itself suggested that agency findings must be reviewed under the substantial evidence test.
Notwithstanding that fact, the Court used the arbitrary and capricious standard-a decision that
would be puzzling if the substantial evidence test were more severe. See State Farm, 463 US at
43-44, 46 (noting that "it is relevant" that Congress requires agency actions to be supported by
substantial evidence, but that the "ultimate question" before the Court was whether the agency
action was arbitrary and capricious). By emphasizing the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
Court seemed to suggest that the substantial evidence standard was essentially identical.
26
State Farm is best taken as adopting the call for searching review issued long before in
Overton Park, 401 US at 420 (remanding to the district court for review "based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision").
27
For a representatively minor pronouncement, at least on the general operation of arbitrariness review, see Verizon Communications, Inc v FCC,535 US 467,502 (2002) (distinguishing
between an original agency interpretation of a statute, which is evaluated under Chevron US.A.
Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984), and a modified agency interpretation, to which State Farm
would be applicable). The most important ruling involving substantial evidence review may well
be Allentown Mack, which did seem to suggest an unusually aggressive approach, but that decision has not spurred significant rethinking in the lower courts. See Stephen Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy:Problems; Text, and Cases 214 (Aspen 6th ed 2006).
The absence of a major ruling from the Court is itself something of a mystery. Why have we
not seen large-scale developments from the Supreme Court in nearly a quarter century? The
answer may well lie in the fact that arbitrariness review is typically focused on specific questions
of fact and policy, which makes Supreme Court review less likely and which also makes Supreme
Court rulings less likely to turn out to be broad pronouncements. We explore this point and its
implications below.
28 Though the central issues involved statutory interpretation rather than arbitrariness, the
Court's decision in Massachusetts v EPA, 127 S Ct 1438 (2007), might well be taken as a modern
version of State Farm, also involving a "hard look." See 127 S Ct at 1463 (holding that the "EPA
has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or
contribute to climate change" despite the EPA's reliance on a report from the National Research
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Some people object that the doctrine has unfortunate systemic effects
on agency decisions.9 Others believe that the hard look is simply too
hard and that a soft look would be much better.' ° Still others fear that

judicial biases play a large role in the operation of the hard look doctrine-that in finding inadequate explanations or unreasonableness on

the merits, the policy preferences of judges are playing a substantial
role.3' It is perhaps revealing here that State Farm itself, involving a
high-profile initiative by the Reagan Administration, produced, on
some key issues, what seemed to be a political division within the

Court on the arbitrariness question, with conservative justices siding
with the Reagan Administration. '" And other observers, most prominently Justice Breyer, have objected that there is an evident incongru-

ity in the fact that under existing doctrine, courts often defer to agency
interpretations of law, while taking a hard look at agency judgments
about policy and fact."
To date, only a sparse empirical literature exists on the actual operation of the hard look doctrine."4 There is no systematic evidence on
the rate of invalidation under hard look review; we do not know if the
rate is 10 percent, or 20 percent, or 40 percent. Nor is there evidence
Council that questioned the causal link). For a valuable discussion to this effect, see Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 S Ct Rev
(forthcoming) ("Before MA v. EPA, it was unclear whether discretionary decisions not to promulgate regulations were even reviewable, let alone subject to the 'hard look' review. In this way,
MA v. EPA could be State Farm for a new generation.").
29
See, for example, Mashaw and Harfst, Auto Safety at 149-51 (cited in note 10) (contending that hard look review led the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to avoid rulemaking and focus on product recalls); Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 391-93 (cited in note 10) (arguing that judicial requirements of an exhaustive investigation of alternatives may prevent agencies with scarce resources from making even minor changes).
30
See, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47
Admin L Rev 59, 65 (1995) (arguing that "courts have transformed the simple, efficient notice
and comment process into an extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and expensive process").
31 See, for example, R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air
Act 11-12 (1983) (asserting that judges no longer trust agencies to develop balanced policies and
use judicial review to push agencies to be more protective of citizens' interests).
32
Compare State Farm, 463 US at 5I, 55-56 (White majority, including Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens) (invalidating as arbitrary an agency decision with respect to detachable
and nondetachable seat belts), with id at 58 (Rehnquist concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the decision on these points was not arbitrary).
33
See Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 394 (cited in note 10) ("Courts are fully capable of
rigorous review of agency determinations of law, for it is the law that they are expert in.... But,
for reasons of 'comparative expertise,' increased judicial scrutiny seems less appropriate [for
policy decisions].").
34 For the principal exceptions, see Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of
Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J Legal Stud 61, 64 n 9, 81 (2002) (presenting evidence that strategic reasons motivate judges' choice of Chevron or State Farm as the basis for their
decisions); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C Circuit,83 Va L
Rev 1717,1719 (1997) (finding that ideology influences judicial voting, that the effect is stronger for
cases less likely to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and that panel effects influence voting).
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on the role, if any, of judicial policy preferences. Do Republican and
Democratic appointees vote differently in cases involving hard look
review? Are panels with a majority of Republican appointees different from panels with a majority of Democratic appointees, and if so,
how different are they?
Our aim here is to begin to fill this gap. We do so through an
analysis of a large data set, consisting of all published appellate rulings
from 1996 to 2006 involving review of decisions of the EPA and review of NLRB decisions either for arbitrariness or for lack of substantial evidence. 5 (For convenience, we use the phrase "arbitrariness review" to capture the relevant test, which does not seem to differ significantly across the two contexts.36) Use of this data set has several
advantages. First, both agency and judicial decisions are fairly easy to
code in political terms, and hence it is possible to test competing hypotheses about the role of judicial ideology." Second, EPA and NLRB
decisions are extremely important in their own right, and they also
provide a good "snapshot" of the world of arbitrariness review.m Third,
there is a large data set, in essentially the same period, involving judicial review of interpretations of law by the EPA and the NLRB." An
examination of arbitrariness review permits instructive comparisons., °
Fourth, the EPA is an executive agency, whose head is an at-will employee of the president, whereas the NLRB is an independent agency,
whose chair and majority are determined by the incumbent president
but whose members may be discharged only for cause (and therefore
have, in practice, a form of tenure). Hence our data set includes two of
the most prominent agencies, one of which has the "executive agency"
form and the other of which has the "independent agency" form."

For arbitrariness review and the NLRB, see note 25.
See note 25 and accompanying text.
37
This task is far more difficult for such agencies as the FCC and the SEC, where political coding can be quite contentious, We have, however, compiled a data set of all cases citing State Farm,
offering some preliminary conclusions about validation rates; the data are available on request.
38
Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that the patterns we observed here are
different from those of other agencies.
39
See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An
EmpiricalInvestigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823,825 (2006).
40 The data set for Chevron cases extends across a larger time period, but we find consistent results across time in those cases. Hence, the comparison holds.
41
While our focus is on the period between 1996 and 2006, it is entirely imaginable that
similar patterns would be found in similar periods, including those preceding State Farm. We
would not be at all surprised, for example, if in review of NLRB cases between 1956 and 1966,
broadly similar patterns might be found. Prior research on how administrative agencies fare
before the Supreme Court reveals that the success rates vary substantially across agencies, but
that overall agencies' success rates are generally stable over time. See note 86. It would be most
interesting, however, to examine directly how the patterns we discern change, if at all, over time.
35

36
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The central goal of arbitrariness review is to filter out serious errors of analysis, not to encode judicial policy preferences, and we are
interested above all in testing whether courts are carrying out that
task. Much of the debate in modern administrative law is about this
question, 2 which has yet to be tested. If Democratic and Republican
appointees show significantly different rates of "liberal voting" in
cases reviewing agency decisions for arbitrariness review, there is evident reason for concern. And if all-Democratic panels show dramatically different voting patterns from all-Republican panels, there is
reason to believe that similarly situated litigants are not being treated
similarly, in a way that has serious consequences for regulatory policy
and even the rule of law.
In brief, our principal findings are as follows:
1.

Political commitments significantly influence the operation of
hard look review in EPA and NLRB cases. When the agency decision is liberal, the Democratic validation rate is 72 percent and
the Republican validation rate is 58 percent. When the agency decision is conservative, the Democratic validation rate drops to 55
percent and the Republican validation rate rises to 72 percent.
For both Republican and Democratic appointees, then, the likelihood of a vote to validate is significantly affected by whether the
agency's decision is liberal or conservative.

2.

In an important sense, these figures understate the role of ideology in hard look review, because panel effects are substantial (regardless of whether the agency decision is liberal or conservative).
Democratic appointees show higher liberal voting rates (75 percent) when sitting with two other Democratic appointees. Republican appointees show lower liberal voting rates (55 percent) when
sitting with two other Republican appointees. The resulting difference between the two sets of appointees-20 percentage pointshas large consequences for the real world of administrative law.

3.

For EPA and NLRB cases, taken together, the overall rate of
votes to validate agency decisions challenged as arbitrary is 64
percent. Notably, the rate at which the judges vote to validate is
significantly higher for Democratic appointees than for Republican appointees: 70 percent for Democratic appointees and 60
percent for Republican appointees. Strikingly, the rate of valida-

42

See, for example, Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 395 (cited in note 10) (questioning whether

judicial review improves agency decisionmaking); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 343 (cited
in note 31) (commenting that "judicial discretion" leads some circuit courts to be especially favorable to environmental groups and others to be especially favorable to business interests).
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tion is essentially the same in arbitrariness review as in cases dealing with statutory interpretation 3 -a finding that casts doubt on
Justice Breyer's suggestion that courts might be giving greater scrutiny to agency judgments of fact than to agency judgments of law."
In general, we provide significant evidence of a role for judicial
ideology in judicial review of agency decisions for arbitrariness. A key
goal of the arbitrary and capricious standard is to ensure that judges
invalidate agency actions when those actions reflect serious analytic
errors or palpable political pressures, and to prevent these errors and
pressures from being translated into grounds for law. 5 Most ambitiously, arbitrariness review can be seen as a response to the uneasy
constitutional position of agencies wielding broad discretionary power;
perhaps such review can reintroduce surrogate safeguards for the decline of constitutional checks on agency authority. But if Democratic
appointees are especially inclined to find conservative decisions to be
arbitrary, and if Republican appointees are especially likely to find liberal decisions to be arbitrary, something is seriously amiss.
Notably, the role of political judgments appears to be strikingly
similar when courts are reviewing agency interpretations of law under
Chevron US.A. Inc v NRDC" and when judges are addressing questions of fact and policy under arbitrariness review. The numbers are
very close in the two contexts. This finding suggests that at least in the
domain of EPA and NLRB decisions, ideology influences judges' decisionmaking to the same extent regardless of the judicial task or the
standard of review. Moreover, the degree of ideological influence
seems roughly the same for both tasks and under both standards.
Our findings offer a clear prediction for the future: when a judiciary consisting mostly of Democratic appointees confronts a conservative executive branch, the rate of invalidations will be unusually high,
and so too when a judiciary consisting mostly of Republican appointees
confronts a liberal executive branch. The conflict between a Democratic
administration and a Republican-dominated judicial branch should be
expected to produce a large number of invalidations in the most important domains of regulatory policy. Notably, such invalidations will typically involve complex questions of law and fact not readily suited to

43 See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 849 (cited in note 39) (finding that circuit
courts have a 64 percent validation rate when evaluating agency decisions under Chevron).
44 See Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 397 (cited in note 10).
45 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv L Rev 505, 553-56
(1985) (contending that the role of hard look review in deregulation cases is to "ferret out" true
irrationality or illegitimate motives).
46 467 US 837 (1984).
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oversight by the Supreme Court. We will offer some suggestions about
how existing doctrines might change to counteract the evident risks.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRELIMINARIES
To understand our study, some background is in order. Agency
decisions might be challenged on many possible grounds. Most obviously, their decisions might violate a governing statute. With respect to
such challenges, much of the current doctrine is organized under the
framework established by the Court's Chevron decision. 7 That decision provides a famous two-step test for evaluating agency interpretations of law. The first question is whether the agency has violated an
unambiguous provision of law. If not, the court proceeds to the second
question, which is whether the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision is reasonable." But many agency interpretations are not
entitled to judicial deference under Chevron, and such interpretations
will receive less deference, or even no deference, from reviewing
courts. '9 We are not concerned with agency interpretations of law here,
except by way of comparison.
Agency decisions might also be challenged as inconsistent with
the procedural requirements of the APA"° or any other applicable
statute. For example, the agency might have issued a rule without using notice and comment procedures, 1 or it might have violated a
statutory prohibition on ex parte communications. 2 Judicial review of
agency compliance with the APA's procedural requirements raises
many important questions, and an empirical study of the relevant judicial decisions would undoubtedly be instructive. Perhaps ideological
voting can be found in this domain as well. Might Democratic appointees be comparatively more willing to find violations of the procedural requirements of the APA when the agency has issued a conservative rule? Might Republican appointees be more willing to inSee id at 842-44.
Id at 843-44.
49
See United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218,226-27 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference applies "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority"); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev
187, 193 (2006) (describing a line of cases suggesting that Chevron may not apply if Congress has
not delegated the power to act with the force of law and a different line of cases suggesting that
Chevron does not apply if a "fundamental issue" is at stake).
50 5 USC § 551 et seq (2000).
47

48

51

See, for example, Community Nutrition Institute v Young, 818 F2d 943,948-49 (DC Cir 1987)

(holding that failure to comply with the notice and comment procedure invalidates agency action).
52

See, for example, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v Federal Labor

Relations Authority, 685 F2d 547, 574 (DC Cir 1982) (finding that there was not sufficient evidence
of ex parte communications to "irrevocably taintl]" the agency decision and require remand).
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validate agency decisions on procedural grounds when those decisions
turn out to be liberal? We suspect so, and it would be valuable to
know; but we do not explore such issues here.
Our focus is on the question of whether agency decisions are
unlawful because they are arbitrary or lack substantial evidence. That
question might be understood as a kind of Step Three, to be asked
directly after the two-step inquiry mandated by Chevron. To understand that question, it is necessary to explore the hard look doctrine
and State Farm in somewhat more detail.
The case itself involved an important controversy over the legal
validity of a change in regulatory policy initiated by the Reagan Administration. Under President Carter, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) had shown considerable interest in
"passive restraints"-in the form of automatic seatbelts or airbagsthat would protect drivers even if they failed to take action to buckle
up. The ultimate regulation, issued in the closing months of the Carter
Administration, required automobile manufacturers to equip new cars
with one of three possible passive restraints: detachable seat belts,
nondetachable seat belts, or air bags. NHTSA concluded that the new
rule would produce at least a 13 percent increase in seat belt usage
and that, as a result, its benefits would justify its costs."
Within six months, President Reagan's NHTSA repealed the
regulation.-' In brief, the agency concluded that, contrary to the analysis conducted under the Carter Administration, the regulation would
not produce a significant increase in seat belt usage, and hence the
benefits were too speculative to justify the imposition of the passive
restraints rule on manufacturers." This conclusion was challenged as
arbitrary; the challengers invoked the hard look doctrine. The government responded quite ambitiously, by attacking that doctrine as
illegitimate; in its view, agency action must be upheld unless it was
found to be wholly irrational through a highly deferential analysis
similar to that undertaken under the Due Process Clause. 7 Notwithstanding its ambition, this argument did not seem implausible in light
of the Court's then-recent decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp v NRDC,m which emphasized that judges had no business burdening agencies with duties that could not be found in the APA or

53
54
55
56
57

58

See State Farm, 463 US 29, 35-39, 51-55 (1983).
Id at 38-40.
Id at 54-55.
Id at 40.
Idat43n9.
435 US 519 (1978).
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some other source of law." Moreover, the government's objection to
the hard look doctrine could draw strength from the view, pressed by
many skeptics in the period, that liberal judges had used the doctrine
to push regulatory policies in the directions that they themselves favored on the merits.In striking down the repeal of the regulation, the Court endorsed
both procedural and substantive aspects of the hard look doctrine.
Speaking in general terms, the Court unanimously said that under arbitrariness review, agencies must provide detailed explanations of
their action, offer careful attention to counterarguments, and show
serious engagement with alternatives." On the merits, the Court concluded, again by a unanimous vote, that the repeal of the regulation
was arbitrary because NHTSA had not investigated whether an "airbags only" alternative would have produced sufficient benefits to justify the rule. By a vote of 5-4, the Court also held that the agency's
analysis of detachable and nondetachable seat belts was arbitrary because it depended on unsupported judgments about likely facts."
The 5-4 division within the Court is especially noteworthy for our
purposes, for it occurred along evidently political lines. The dissenting
opinion was written by then-Justice Rehnquist, who emphasized that
it was entirely appropriate for President Reagan to reject the policies
of his predecessor. In his words,
[t]he agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related
to the election of a new President of a different political
party... A change in administration brought about by the people
casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations."
Thus, Justice Rehnquist offered a firm plea for judicial deference in
the face of the new commitments of a new administration -a plea that
bears directly on the data we shall offer here.

59 See id at 550-51 ("Time and resources are simply too limited to hold that an impact
statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out every possible alternative.").
60 See, for example, Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 12 (cited in note 31).
61 See State Farm, 463 US at 47-51 (affirming that an agency must explain the reasoning
behind its decisions, not as a matter of procedure but in order to demonstrate its thorough consideration of the issue at hand).
62
See id at 48-49 (indicating that the agency had described air bags as effective and yet did
not consider the viable alternative of mandatory air bag installation).
63
See id at 51-55 (finding that agency reasoning that equates the effects of detachable and
nondetachable seat belts is inadequate to refute specific determinations made by the previous
administration).
64 Id at 59 (Rehnquist concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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State Farm was widely taken to have ratified the hard look doctrine." The Court's description of the appropriate standard of review,
and its conclusions on the merits, suggested that courts should require
detailed justifications for agency action and also examine the reasonableness of the agency's conclusions. There was obvious tension, however, between State Farm and Chevron, which was decided just one
year later.6 Under State Farm,courts would take a hard look at agency
judgments of policy and fact; under Chevron, courts would give considerable deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Hence it was natural to object, as did then-Judge Breyer, that a sensible system of judicial review would not entitle courts to give careful
scrutiny to judgments of policy and fact while also requiring them to
67
defer on questions of law. If we attend to the distinctive competence
of agencies and courts, the opposite conclusion might seem hard to
resist: questions of law are for judicial resolution, whereas questions of
policy and fact should be resolved by agencies.
But this simple comparison between State Farm and Chevron
misses some complexities. First, it may not be correct to suggest that
the former decision implies "less" deference than the latter. Under
Chevron, agencies must obey unambiguous statutes, and even when
there is ambiguity, agency interpretations must be reasonable. Under
State Farm, agency decisions will also be upheld so long as they are
reasonable.0 In the abstract, it would be possible to read the two rulings in a way that would not create the anomaly to which Justice
Breyer objects. In any case, it is much too simple to suggest that courts

65
See, for example, Sunstein, 1983 S Ct Rev at 178 (cited in note 20) (claiming that the
Court endorsed aspects of the hard look doctrine developed by the DC Circuit); Breyer, 38
Admin L Rev at 387-88 (cited in note 10) (noting that the State Farm Court stated that it applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard but actually applied "strict review" earlier described as the

hard look doctrine); Peter L. Strauss, ConsideringPoliticalAlternatives to "Hard Look" Review,

1989 Duke L J 538, 539 (remarking that the State Farm decision "essentially endorsed" the hard
look standard); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw U L

Rev 997, 1043 n 273 (2007) (stating that the hard look doctrine is derived from State Farm).
66 See Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 373,387-88 (cited in note 10).
67
See id.
68 See, for example, Public Citizen v Young, 831 F2d 1108, 1122 (DC Cir 1987) (finding that
the FDA's construction of a statute violated clear congressional intent and thus was not entitled
to respect).
69
See, for example, Ohio v Department of the Interior, 880 F2d 432, 464 (DC Cir 1989)
(holding that the Department of the Interior's refusal to account for option and existence values
was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute).
70
See, for example, Syracuse Peace Council v FCC, 867 F2d 654, 669 (DC Cir 1989) (holding that the agency's decision to rescind the "fairness doctrine"-and thus its requirements regarding broadcast media coverage of vital public issues-was reasonable).
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should decide questions of law on their own." Where statutes are am-

biguous, the resolution of the ambiguity frequently requires judgments
of policy and principle. Chevron rests on the belief that such judgments should be made by officials with a degree of accountability and

specialized competence, not by judges.72
But if this point is correct, State Farm itself must be taken with
some caution. Review of agency decisions for arbitrariness often involves highly technical issues of policy and fact, and rulings by courts
of appeals are usually too particularistic to be well suited to Supreme
Court review. If State Farm is operating in a way that reflects judicial

policy preferences, Justice Breyer's objection has considerable force.
The empirical questions emerge as the important ones. What, exactly, have appellate courts 3 been doing? What might be said about
the real world of arbitrariness review? It is to these questions that we

now turn.
I. ARBITRARINESS REVIEW OF EPA AND
NLRB DECISIONS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
A.

Data and Method

We devote our attention to two agencies whose decisions have a
high degree of practical importance and political salience: the EPA
and the NLRB."4 We extracted from the standard legal databases a list
of appellate court cases that applied arbitrary and capricious or sub71 See, for example, E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress; Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 Vill Envir L J 1, 16-18

(2005) (arguing that judicial deference to agency interpretations increases democratic legitimacy
because decisions rest on "science-based determinations that Congress authorized" by agencies
subject to executive oversight, not on one judge's interpretation of the congressional history, which
often serves to mask the judge's policy preferences); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 Duke L J 511,513 (citing the Attorney General's Administrative Procedure Report as stating that "[e]ven on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems not to be compelled" and that agency interpretations should play a powerful role).
72

See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is,

115 Yale L J 2580, 2587 (2006) (contending that Chevron rests on the assertion that agencies are
better equipped for statutory interpretation because of agency expertise, oversight by the executive, and the ability to more quickly and adequately adapt statutes to new situations).
73 We put decisions by the Supreme Court to one side, on the ground that the Court has
decided very few cases involving "arbitrariness" review, and hence the small number of observations would make it difficult to draw inferences.
74 A valuable discussion of judicial review of NLRB decisions, involving a different data
set and somewhat different questions but overlapping conclusions, is James J. Brudney, Sara
Schiavoni, and Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern,60 Ohio St L J 1675 (1999) (studying the impact of

educational experience, race, sex, political affiliation, and work experience on circuit court
judges' decisions in cases involving the National Labor Relations Act, and controlling for deference to the NLRB).
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stantial evidence review to decisions of the EPA and the NLRB 5 between 1996 and 2006. There were 653 cases in all, and a strong majority of these cases (554) reviewed NLRB decisions. It would be natural
to think that in view of these numbers, our focus is largely on review
of NLRB decisions, but most of the patterns do not significantly differ
as between review of EPA decisions and review of NLRB decisions.
Indeed, we have studied cases citing State Farm itself, in which EPA
cases form a majority; 7 in that data set, the EPA cases are more numerous than the NLRB cases, and many of the patterns we find
here-above all, a significant ideological split between Democratic
and Republican appointees-can be found there as well. Where the
differences are significant, we report them. (Our strong suspicion is
that the same general patterns would be found for other agencies, but
that point must remain speculative for now.) We coded the votes of
the individual judges in these cases and assembled a file of judge-bycase observations. Of the 1,959 total votes by judges in these cases, 807
were from appointees of Democratic presidents and 1,152 were from
appointees of Republican presidents.
For all of the key questions, illuminating patterns emerge, allowing us to assess party and panel effects in arbitrariness review. We are
also able to disaggregate the data in such a way as to cast light on
questions that have been explored in the literature on both arbitrariness review and judicial behavior under Chevron."
To test the role of judicial policy judgments, we use several interacting measures. For judges, we focus on the party of the appointing
president, because that factor has importance in its own right and because it serves as a rough proxy for the ideological preferences of the
judges. To say the least, it would be valuable to know if Democratic
appointees are especially likely to find arbitrariness on the part of
Republican administrations, or if the validation rates of Republican
appointees increase when the president is a Republican. Although
political scientists have legitimately criticized the use of party as a
proxy for political ideology" and often use "common space scores" as
75

See note 39.

76

See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Hard Look in Practice5-6, 10 (unpub-

lished manuscript, 2007).
77 We conducted regression analysis to verify the robustness of our findings to other possible influences on a judge's review of an arbitrariness challenge. In addition to the variables described in Parts II and III, the regressions included fixed effect controls for circuits and years.
The regression analysis did not alter the conclusions we reached from examining summary statistics, and therefore, we omit the regressions from our discussion here.
78
See, for example, Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U Chi L Rev 1,
88-89 (2002). See also Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-making under a Norm of Consensus: A
StructuralAnalysis of Three-judge Panels 2-3 (First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Stud-
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an alternate measure,"9 the political party of the appointing president
remains a valuable tool of inquiry, especially for those interested in
the power of the executive to move the federal judiciary in its preferred directions.
We measure the political content of agency decisions in two distinct ways. First, we classify agency decisions as "conservative" or "liberal" on the basis of the identity of the party making the challenge.
When a labor union or public interest group challenges an agency decision, we deem it to be relevantly "conservative." When an industry
group or corporation challenges the agency's decision, we code it as
relevantly "liberal." The reason for this approach is that the reviewing
court assesses the position of an agency not in the abstract but in relation to the claims of the particular challenger. When a public interest
group, such as the Sierra Club or the Natural Resources Defense
Council, brings a challenge, the agency appears conservative relative
to the challenger. When a corporation challenges an agency decision
that regulates water pollution or finds an unfair labor practice, the
agency appears liberal relative to the challenger. This coding scheme
does introduce some imprecision, which we attempted to correct by
investigating individual cases; but as compared to the alternative of ad
hoc evaluation of each agency policy, its objectivity and its easy administrability are its virtues. It is important not to be confused by the
measure: a Republican administration might issue many decisions that
are relevantly liberal, in the sense that companies find it worthwhile to
challenge them, and observers might nonetheless conclude that those
decisions are conservative by some objective measure.
Our second proxy for the political direction of the agency decision is whether the case was decided during a Democratic or Republican administration. As a general rule, the positions of agencies under
Democratic presidencies are certainly more liberal (or less conservative) than those of agencies under Republican presidencies. To the
ies, 2006) (positing a structural model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity within parties of the
appointing president).
79 See, for example, Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and
Academic Debates about StatisticalMeasures,99 Nw U L Rev 743,784-85 (2005) (describing how
a "common space score" accounts for variation within a political party and for instances when
the president defers to senators' recommendations for judicial appointment); Keith T. Poole and
Howard Rosenthal, Congress:A Political-economic History of Roll Call Voting 11-26 (Oxford
1997) (describing a multidimensional empirical model of congressional roll call voting occupying
Euclidean space); Nolan M. McCarty and Keith T. Poole, Veto Power and Legislation:An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargainingfrom 1961 to 1986, 11 J L, Econ, & Org 282,
288 (1995) (employing a one-dimensional spatial model of policy preferences).
80 See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Metaanalysis, 20 Just Sys J 219, 243 (1999) (analyzing eighty-four empirical studies and finding that
there is a link between political party affiliation and judicial voting behavior).
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extent that this generalization is crude, it remains independently important to understand how judicial behavior changes across administrations. A potential difficulty with this measure is that litigation may
take years to resolve, and courts of appeals might well be asked to
evaluate a regulation, initially issued under the Clinton Administration, during the Bush Administration. When litigation extends across
administrations of opposing parties, misattributions may occur. But it
is not entirely clear that the relevant question is the political affiliation
of the administration that initially issued a regulation or a final order;
perhaps what matters is the affiliation of the administration that is
litigating the case. Note that a new administration has the opportunity
to reverse agency positions and to settle ongoing cases before the
court issues its decision."' In any event, our findings are not significantly affected if we adjust the data to consider the administration
that originally issued the regulation or order.
B.

Judicial Votes and Partisan Affiliations
1. Validation rates.

Table 1 reports the rates at which appellate judges vote to validate the decisions of the EPA and the NLRB under the arbitrary and
capricious and substantial evidence standards.K Column (1) shows the
total validation rates for Democratic and Republican appointees. It
reveals that overall, Democratic appointees vote with significantly
higher frequency to validate decisions of the EPA and the NLRB. The
total validation rate under arbitrariness review is quite close to the
validation rate under Chevron of 64 percent.3 But a difference between arbitrariness review and Chevron is immediately apparent. In
the Chevron cases, the overall validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees are the same, while under arbitrariness review the
validation rate of Democratic appointees is 10 percentage points
higher than that of Republican appointees.
81 For ease of exposition, we refer to the administrations as Republican or Democratic, but
over the time period studied, 1996-2006, the Clinton Administration was the only Democratic
administration, and the administration of George W Bush was the only Republican administration.
82 It is generally believed that EPA decisions are typically reviewed under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, and NLRB decisions under the substantial evidence standard, but the
belief is too crude. Some NLRB decisions are set aside as arbitrary, and some EPA decisions are
evaluated, under relevant statutes, for lack of substantial evidence. See, for example, Islander
East Pipeline Co v Connecticut Departmentof EnvironmentalProtection,482 F3d 79, 100 (2d Cir
2006) (holding that the EPA's decision that a pipeline would dramatically alter the surrounding
habitat was not supported by substantial evidence); New England Health Care Employees Union
v NLRB, 448 F3d 189, 193 (2d Cir 2006) (holding that the NLRB's determination that an employer did not act with unlawful intent was arbitrary and capricious).
83
See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 849 (cited in note 39).
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TABLE 1
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN ARBITRARINESS
REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
AND BY IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF AGENCY DECISION
Ideological content of agency decision

Party of appointing president

(A) Democrat

(B) Republican
Difference of (A)-(B):

Total
(1)

Liberal
(2)

Not
liberal
(3)

Difference
of (2)-(3)

0.699

0.721

0.548

0.173***

(0.016)
[807]

(0.017)
[703]

(0.049)
[104]

(0.048)

0.596
(0.014)
[1,152]

0.582
(0.015)
[1,037]

0.722
(0.042)
[115]

-0.139**
(0.048)

0.103***
(0.022)

0.139**
(0.023)

-0.174**
(0.064)

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level,
and *** denotes difference significant at 1 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

What accounts for this difference? The answer lies in the higher
proportion of liberal agency decisions among the arbitrariness cases,

which makes ideological differences immediately detectable. Decisions by the NLRB comprise a far larger share of our data set here,
and most of these decisions are liberal by our standards. (Recall that
those standards are relative, not absolute; an employer might challenge an NLRB decision that has a Republican majority, even though
the decision is far more conservative than what would emerge from an
NLRB decision with a Democratic majority.) NLRB decisions account
for 85 percent of the arbitrariness cases but only 28 percent of the
Chevron cases.8 In addition, over 94 percent of the NLRB decisions
reviewed for arbitrariness or lack of substantial evidence were liberal," while 67 percent of those reviewed under Chevron were coded
as liberal. In contrast, EPA decisions, under both Chevron and arbitrariness review, were roughly evenly split between liberal and conservative decisions. Because most agency decisions subjected to arbi-

84 See id at 825.
85 This figure is consistent with prior studies of NLRB decisionmaking. See, for example,
William N. Cooke, et al, The Determinantsof NLRB Decision-makingRevisited, 48 Indus Labor Rel
Rev 237,239 (1995) (showing that nearly 87 percent of unfair labor practice disputes that remained
unresolved prior to a circuit court or Supreme Court decision were brought against employers).
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trariness review were liberal, ideological differences are immediately

apparent in the arbitrariness data.
Although we do not have a definitive explanation for the differences in the number and nature of the two agencies' decisions, we believe that the underlying reason is straightforward. The EPA makes

essentially all of its policies via rulemaking, and the number of rules in
any particular year is relatively small. Because they are conducted

against the background of clear regulations, EPA adjudications frequently involve the application of settled law to not-much-disputed

fact, and the room for challenge in court is not large. By contrast, the
NLRB makes essentially all of its policies via adjudication, and the
number of adjudications in any particular year is large. Moreover,
there is considerable room for challenging the NLRB's judgments
about policy and fact. The making of national labor policy through
case-by-case decisionmaking has attracted considerable skeptical attention within the Supreme Court itself.R The large number of NLRB
cases in our sample reflects the fact that the NLRB makes many more
decisions that are subject to a plausible challenge on arbitrariness or
substantial evidence grounds. By contrast, a high percentage of EPA
decisions can be challenged on Chevron grounds, and a high percentage of NLRB decisions cannot be; hence, the proportions in Chevron
cases are not so lopsided.
This sizable gap in the ideological direction of the agency decisions generates a difference in the validation rates across the two
agencies. Figure 1 shows the rates at which judges of both parties
voted to validate the decisions of the two agencies. The EPA enjoyed a
higher rate of validation when its decisions faced challenges for arbitrariness. Overall, judges voted to validate EPA decisions 72 percent

86 Researchers have long observed wide differences across agencies in the rate at which
the Supreme Court validates their decisions. Bradley C. Canon and Micheal Giles, Recurring
Litigants: FederalAgencies before the Supreme Court, 25 W Polit Q 183, 184 (1972) (reporting
that agency success rates before the Court range from 56 percent to 91 percent); Roger
Handberg, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies; 1965-1978, 6 J Contemp L 161, 168
(1979) (extending the Canon and Giles data set's scope by five years and reporting agency success rates before the Supreme Court ranging from 55 percent to 91 percent); Donald W. Crowley,
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency Matter?, 40 W Polit Q 265,
271 (1987) (finding that agencies classified as economic have a 79 percent success rate before the
Court while those classified as social have a 68 percent success rate); Reginald S. Sheehan, Administrative Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes, 43 W Polit Q 875, 880 (1990) (reporting that social and economic agencies have
similar success rates overall but that substantial variation exists when social agencies' decisions
are classified as liberal or conservative).
87 See Allentown Mack & Service, Inc v NLRB, 522 US 359, 372-73 (1998) (objecting that
the NLRB may use a standard other than the "announced standard" in its adjudications).
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of the time compared to only 62 percent for decisions of the NLRB."
EPA decisions also produced a more modest partisan gap in the judges'
voting. The rate at which Democratic and Republican appointees
voted to reject arbitrariness challenges to EPA decisions differed by
fewer than 2 percentage points. The gap for NLRB decisions was considerably larger. Democratic appointees voted to validate NLRB decisions 70 percent of the time, while Republican appointees did so only
58 percent of the time.
FIGURE 1
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN ARBITRARINESS REVIEW
CASES BY AGENCY AND BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT

80.0
70.0

71.4
57.6

60.050.040.0-

30.020.010.00.01
EPA

NLRB

Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the lightly shaded
bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.

The differences across agencies have many similarities as well as
some contrasts with our earlier findings with respect to Chevron review." The primary contrast is that under Chevron, the NLRB enjoyed
88 Despite the difference across these two agencies, these validation rates are similar to
those prior researchers have found in appellate court review of administrative agency decisions.
See Martha Anne Humphries and Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of
FederalAdministrative Agencies, 61 J Polit 207, 215 (1999) (finding that the approval rate for all
agency decisions was 58 percent); David H. Willison, JudicialReview of Administrative Decisions:
Agency Cases before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1981-1984, 14 Am Polit
Rsrch 317, 321 (1986) (finding that the approval rate for EPA decisions was 59 percent, the approval rate for NLRB decisions was 64 percent, and the approval rate for all agency decisions
was 66 percent).
89 For earlier findings, see Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 852-54 (cited in note 39).
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a slightly higher validation rate than the EPA, while under arbitrariness review, this ordering is reversed. The primary common feature is
that under both arbitrariness review and Chevron, the partisan gap in
validation rates is largest for NLRB decisions. Evidently the labormanagement relations that come to the federal courts of appeals are
more ideologically contentious than are the environmental issues,
which might well appear more technical.
When we decompose the data by examining the ideological content of the agency decisions, we find even more substantial differences
in the behavior of the two groups of appointees.
2. Political voting and failed aspirations.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 stratify the voting rates by the
partisan policy direction of the agency decision, and we now see an
especially sharp contrast in the voting patterns of Republican and
Democratic appointees. We are able to demonstrate for the first time9
that judicial policy judgments play an unquestionable role under arbitrariness review.
a) Liberal agencies,conservative agencies. When the agency deci-

sion is conservative, Democratic appointees conclude that the decision
was not arbitrary or capricious at a rate that is 17 percentage points
lower than when the agency decision is liberal. The pattern is in the
opposite direction for Republican appointees. When the agency decision is liberal, Republican appointees conclude that the decision is not
arbitrary or capricious at a rate that is 14 percentage points lower than
when the agency decision is conservative. These patterns imply that
the validation rates of Democratic appointees are nearly 14 percentage points above those of their Republican counterparts for liberal
agency decisions and about 17 percentage points below those of Republican appointees for conservative agency decisions. To say the
least, this is a dramatic difference in the operation of hard look review.
These findings contain striking similarities to our previous analysis of judicial review under Chevron. The frequency of agency validation is nearly identical under arbitrary and capricious review as it is
under Chevron; both are about 64 percent.9' This finding bears on the
concern voiced by Justice Breyer two decades ago, to the effect that
under existing doctrine, agencies might be significantly more likely to

90 A more limited data set, focusing on EPA decisions in the DC Circuit, reaches a similar
conclusion. See Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1719 (cited in note 34) (asserting that "ideology significantly influences decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit").
91 Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 849 (cited in note 39).
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lose on issues of fact and policies than on issues of law.Y Our data do
not confirm this prediction. Rather, the data appear consistent with
now-standard analyses of litigant decisionmaking. Litigants should be
expected to adjust their behavior to the prevailing standard of review,2 and the roughly similar validation rates under arbitrariness review and Chevron suggest that litigants readily make these adjustments. Because litigants are likely to adjust their decisions in accordance with the intensity of review, our figures cannot be taken to answer the question of whether Chevron review is more rigorous than
arbitrariness review, or vice versa. A constant rate of 64 percent is possible even if one standard is far more searching than another-at least
if we assume, as seems likely, that the selection of cases will be affected by litigant perceptions of when they are least likely to lose.
Both Chevron and State Farm seek to cabin the influence of judicial ideology in review of agency decisionmaking. An evident aspiration of the Chevron approach is to limit the role of judicial judgments
in the domain of policy.Y Despite its command of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of law, the persistence of judicial politics under Chevron is plain."'State Farm does call for judicial scrutiny
of agency judgments about fact and policy, but the Court made clear
that so long as the agency offered "a reasoned analysis," it would be
permitted to do as it saw fit." Indeed, State Farm must be taken in the
context of both Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc v Volpe, where
the Court emphasized that "the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one" affording the agency "a presumption of regularity," and
Vermont Yankee, where the Court stressed that the ultimate decision is
for agencies, not for courts.9 The Court has yet to offer an unambiguous warning about the politicization of judicial review under scrutiny
of possible "arbitrariness," but the key decisions are plainly meant to
reduce the relevant risks.

92 See Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 397 (cited in note 10).
93 See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J

Legal Stud 1, 5 (1984) (arguing that "the individual maximizing decisions of the parties will
create a strong bias toward a rate of success.., of 50 percent regardless of the substantive standard of law"). See also Part IV.A.
94 See Elliott, 16 Vill Envir L J at 18 (cited in note 71).
95
See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 860 (cited in note 39).
96 463 US at 42.
97 401 US 402 (1971).
98 See id at 415-16 (explicating a standard that is less than substantial evidence but is still a
"thorough, probing, in-depth review").
99 See 435 US at 524 ("[Tlhis Court has for more than four decades emphasized that the
formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which
Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments.").
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Notwithstanding the Court's aspirations, the figures in Table 1
show a large role for judicial policy preferences in the operation of
arbitrariness review. The magnitude of the fluctuation in validation
rates between liberal and conservative agency decisions is roughly the
same in arbitrariness review cases as it is in Chevron cases. ' Under
both standards, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican
appointees seesaw in response to the ideological content of the agency
decision. When the agency decision is liberal, Democratic appointees
validate more often than Republican appointees by about 14 percentage points, and when the agency decision is conservative, Republican
appointees validate more often by about 17 percentage points. The
results demonstrate that arbitrariness review under the State Farm
framework has failed to eliminate the influence of judicial ideology in
review of agency decisions of policy and fact. '
(b) Republican administrations,Democratic administrations.Ta-

ble 2 presents validation rates for the two groups of judges when the
party of the current president is used as the measure of the political
valence of the agency decision. We anticipated that Republican appointees would be more likely to uphold decisions under Republican
administrations and that Democratic appointees would be more likely
to uphold decisions under Democratic administrations-and indeed
this is the pattern we observe in the Chevron context."2
We were initially surprised to find that for Democratic appointees, the validation rates do not correlate with the party of the current
president in the predicted ways. The validation rates of Democratic
appointees do not vary with the party of the current president. By
contrast, those of Republican appointees do move in the predicted
direction. During a Democratic administration, Democratic appointees vote to validate EPA and NLRB decisions 70 percent of the time,
a rate virtually identical to their validation rate during Republican
administrations. But the validation rates of Republican appointees are
about 8 percentage points higher during Republican administrations.

100 See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 849 (cited in note 39) (reporting that Democratic appointees validate liberal agency decisions more often than Republican appointees by
about 14 percentage points and that Republican appointees validate conservative agency deci-

sions more often by about 19 percentage points).
101 When we decompose these data by individual agency, the patterns are similar. The seesaw pattern is very sharp in the NLRB decisions. It is more muted in the EPA decisions. There,
the validation rates of Republican appointees respond little to the ideological direction of the
agency decision whereas the validation rates of Democratic appointees fluctuate by about 20
percentage points.
102 See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 850 (cited in note 39).
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TABLE 2
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN ARBITRARINESS
REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
AND BY PARTY OF CURRENT PRESIDENT
Party of current president
Party of appointing
president
(A) Democrat

(B) Republican
Difference of (A)-(B):

Total
(1)
0.699
(0.016)
[807]

Democrat
(2)
0.698
(0.022)
[427]

Republican
(3)
0.700
(0.025)
[380]

Difference
of (2)-(3)
-0.002
(0.032)

0.596
(0.014)
[1,152]

0.561
(0.020)
[617]

0.637
(0.021)
[535]

-0.077**
(0.029)

0.103***
(0.022)

0.137***
(0.030)

0.063**
(0.032)

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level,
and *** denotes difference significant at 1 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

These patterns show that when reviewing EPA and NLRB decisions for arbitrariness, the validation rates of Democratic appointees
are higher than those of Republican appointees, irrespective of which
party currently holds the Presidency. During Democratic Presidencies,
the validation rates of Democratic appointees in these cases were 14
percentage points higher than that of Republican appointees, and during Republican Presidencies, this difference was only 6 percentage
points. But the gap between these figures (14 versus 6) is not statistically meaningful. What is clear is that Democratic appointees validate
EPA and NLRB decisions at higher rates during both Democratic and
Republican administrations during this period.
At first blush, Tables 1 and 2 present a confusing and inconsistent
picture of whether judges are responsive to the ideological content of
the agency decision. In Table 1, the validation rates of appointees from
both parties appear highly responsive to political considerations, while
in Table 2, the validation rates of Democratic appointees appear consistently higher than those of Republican appointees. How can these
patterns be explained?
The answer lies in the fact that Republican administrations often
produce a rule, decision, or order that is relevantly liberal, in the sense
that it is challenged by a company that is regulated by an EPA rule or
displeased by a finding of an unfair labor practice by the NLRB. So
too, a Democratic administration may and often does produce a deci-
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sion or rule that is relevantly conservative, in the sense that it is challenged by a public interest group or a labor union. It is for this reason
that in these data, the purely political coding of the agency decision is a
far more accurate measure than the party of the administration at the
time the court issues its ruling. As previously described, our data set
here consists disproportionately of liberal decisions by the NLRB. '°3
For that reason, it should not be puzzling that in Table 2 the validation rates of Democratic appointees appear higher than those of
Republican appointees in both Republican and Democratic administrations. What matters most is whether the agency decision was liberal, not whether it was issued under a Republican president. It follows that if the goal is to assess the role of judicial ideology in arbitrariness review, there is reason for much greater confidence in the
estimates based on our direct coding of the agency decisions.
With these qualifications in mind, the central findings are clear. In
cases applying arbitrariness review, the validation rates of Democratic
appointees exceed those of Republican appointees by about 10 percentage points. When individual agency decisions are classified according to their ideological content, the role of politics is unmistakable:
Democratic appointees are far more likely to uphold liberal decisions
than conservative ones, and Republican appointees show the opposite
pattern. Arbitrariness review is being applied in a way that shows a
large influence from judicial policy preferences.
C.

Panel Effects
1. The standard patterns.

A great deal of evidence shows that the composition of appellate
panels significantly influences the voting behavior of individual judges.
In many domains, the standard pattern includes both ideological
dampening and ideological amplification.' Dampening occurs when a

Democratic appointee shows unusually conservative voting patterns if
sitting with two Republican appointees, and when a Republican appointee shows unusually liberal voting patterns if sitting with two
Democratic appointees. Amplification occurs when the most liberal
103 A comparison of the number of conservative agency decisions in Table 1 with the number of decisions arising during Republican administrations in Table 2 makes this point clear. The
total number of judges' votes in conservative agency decisions, 219 (104 + 115), is far less than
the total number of judges' votes during Republican administrations, 915 (380 + 535). These totals
imply that under the Republican administration during our observation period, most EPA and
NLRB decisions reviewed for arbitrariness by Republican appointees were "liberal" in our sense,
and this finding explains the apparent anomalies in the voting patterns of those appointees.
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?:An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Federal
Judiciary8-9 (Brookings 2006).
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voting patterns, by individual judges, are found for Democratic appointees on panels consisting of only Democratic appointees, and
when the most conservative patterns, by individual judges, are found
for Republican appointees on all-Republican panels.',0
2. The standard patterns here.
Democratic appointees typically show increasingly liberal voting
patterns as the number of Democratic appointees increases, and Republican appointees typically show increasingly conservative voting
patterns as the number of Republican appointees increases. ' 1 As we
shall soon see, our most striking finding here is a form of ideological
amplification, clearly demonstrated once agency and judicial decisions
are coded in political terms. In arbitrariness cases, Democratic appointees show heightened liberal voting on all-Democratic (DDD)
panels, just as Republican appointees show heightened conservative
voting on all-Republican (RRR) panels.
Figure 2 examines whether panel effects are present in the distinctive context of validation rates. The rates of Democratic appointees appear in the lightly shaded bars and those of Republican appointees appear in darkly shaded bars. Panel effects are evident in the voting patterns of the appointees of presidents of both political parties. But they
are more pronounced for Republican appointees. When sitting with two
other Democratic appointees, the average Democratic appointee votes
to validate 75 percent of the time. This rate falls by roughly 5 percentage
points when the panel has one Republican appointee and by another 2
percentage points when it has two Republican appointees.

105

See, for example, Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 864 (cited in note 39).

106 See, for example, id at 860; Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?at 20-23 (cited in note 104).
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FIGURE 2
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES
IN ARBITRARINESS REVIEW CASES BY PANEL COMPOSITION
AND BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT

0.01
DR

DD

Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the lightly shaded
bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.

Republican appointees demonstrate slightly greater responsiveness to panel composition. The validation rate of the average Republican appointee falls by a bit more than 6 percentage points when she
sits with one Democratic appointee and one Republican appointee,
rather than two Democratic appointees. When a panel consists of two
other Republicans rather than a Democrat and another Republican,
her average validation rate falls by 5 percentage points. We observe a
modest form of ideological amplification. 7
107 This movement in the validation rates of Republican appointees implies a large difference in the validation rates of politically uniform panels. Even before considering the political
direction of the agency decisions, the difference in the validation rates of all-Democratic and all-
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As Table 1 reveals, overall validation rates obscure pronounced
ideological patterns. Table 3 therefore decomposes the validation rates
of Democratic and Republican appointees by both panel composition
and the ideological content of the agency decision.' It compares the
validation rates for judges appointed by presidents of each party according to whether the panel was politically "mixed" and whether the
agency decision was liberal. Column (1) of Table 3 shows the overall
validation rates, and these figures are comparable to those in Figure 2.
But this grouping of the data showcases two points. First, the validation rates steadily decline as the number of Republican appointees on
a panel grow. Second, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees sitting on politically mixed panels are fairly close; they
differ by 7 percentage points.
The remaining columns of Table 3 display the relationship of
validation rates to the nature of the agency decisions. Two patterns are
immediately evident. First, politically unified panels exhibit strong
ideological responses to the content of the agency decisions. Too much
importance should not be attached to the precise magnitudes of these
differences because the number of votes in cases reviewing agency
decisions is small. But the general patterns are clear. The average validation rate of a panel consisting of three Democratic appointees is 43
percentage points higher when the agency decision is liberal than when
it is conservative! For panels consisting of three Republican appointees,
the response is even stronger but in the opposite direction. The average
validation rate of all-Republican panels is 29 percentage points lower
when the agency decision is liberal than when it is conservative.

Republican panels is 17 percentage points. Again, this difference is due primarily to the drop in
the validation rates of all-Republican panels.
108 Because ideological content matters and the political affiliation of the president does
not, we do not separately report panel effects according to that affiliation. We have analyzed the
relevant data, however, and our findings are available on request.
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TABLE 3
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN ARBITRARINESS
REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT, BY IDEOLOGICAL
CONTENT OF AGENCY DECISION, AND BY PANEL COMPOSITION
Ideological content of agency decision
Panel
composition

Total
(1)

Liberal
(2)

Not
liberal
(3)

Difference
of (2)-(3):

DDD

0.746
(0.037)

0.812
(0.036)

0.381
(0.109)

0.431**
(0.097)

[1381

[117]

[211

Party of appointing
president
(A) Democrat

(B) Democrat

DDR or RRD

0.689
(0.018)
[669]

0.703
(0.019)
[586]

0.590
(0.054)
[83]

0.113**
(0.054)

(C) Republican

DDR or RRD

0.619
(0.018)
[767]

0.612
(0.019)
[685]

0.683
(0.052)
[82]

-0.071
(0.057)

(D) Republican

RRR

0.551
(0.025)
[385]

0.526
(0.027)
[352]

0.818
(0.068)
[33]

-0.293**
(0.090)

Difference of
(A)-(B):

0.057
(0.043)

0.109**
(0.045)

-0.209*
(0.121)

Difference of
(A)-(C):

0.127**
(0.044)

0.200***
(0.048)

-0.302**
(0.116)

Difference of
(A)-(D):

0.196***
(0.048)

0.286***
(0.051)

-0.437***
(0.122)

Difference of
(B)-(C):

0.070**
(0.025)

0.091***
(0.027)

-0.093
(0.075)

Difference of
(B)-(D):

0.138***
(0.030)

0.178***
(0.032)

-0.228**
(0.096)

Difference of
(C)-(D):

0.069**
(0.031)

0.086**
(0.032)

-0.135
(0.092)

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level,
and *** denotes difference significant at 1 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

These patterns imply that when the agency decision is liberal, the
validation rate of a Democratic appointee sitting on a panel with two
other Democratic appointees is 29 percentage points higher than that
of a Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees. When the agency decision is instead conservative, the direction of
this gap reverses but its magnitude remains very large. The validation
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rate of a Democratic appointee sitting with two other Democratic appointees is 44 percentage points below that of a Republican appointee
sitting with two other Republican appointees. Here, then, is a clear
"smoking gun" with respect to panel effects.
These figures reveal an important point: the seesawing validation
rates of Democratic and Republican appointees in response to the
nature of agency decisions (shown in Table 1) is largely attributable to
the behavior of judges on politically unified panels. A comparison of
Rows (A) and (D) in Table 3 shows a pattern of seesawing validation
rates akin to that in Table 1-only more pronounced. The validation
rates of Democratic appointees sitting with two other Democratic
appointees are almost the mirror image of those of Republican appointees sitting with two other Republican appointees.
For judges sitting on politically mixed panels, the movement of
validation rates in response to the ideological content of the agency
decision is muted but not entirely absent. A Democratic appointee on a
politically mixed panel has an average validation rate 11 percentage
points higher when the agency decision is liberal rather than conservative, and this movement is statistically significant. A Republican appointee on a politically mixed panel votes to validate under arbitrariness
review 7 percentage points less often when the agency decision is liberal
rather than conservative, but this difference is not statistically significant.
These patterns also mean that when the agency decision is liberal,
Democratic appointees on politically mixed panels vote to validate
about 9 percentage points more often than do Republican appointees
on politically mixed panels. The opposite happens when the agency
decision is conservative; the average Democratic appointee on a politically mixed panel votes in favor of validation 9 percentage points
less often than the average Republican appointee on a politically
mixed panel. Even on politically mixed panels, Democratic and Republican appointees react to the ideological content of agency decisions in the predicted directions, and their responses are large enough
to generate a seesaw pattern in validation rates. Notably, however, this
pattern is less pronounced than on politically uniform panels.
3. Comparing Chevron.
As striking as these ideological patterns are, the role of judicial
partisanship under Chevron is just as distinct, if not more so. In terms
of raw numbers, the effect of such partisanship is even more dramatic
under Chevron. The rate at which Democratic appointees sitting with
two other Democratic appointees voted to validate liberal agency in-
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terpretations of statutes was 32 percentage points higher than for conservative agency interpretations.1" For Republican appointees sitting
with two other Republican appointees, the validation rate was more
than 40 percentage points higher when the agency interpretation was
conservative than when it was liberal."" Hence it is plausible, but false,
to speculate that Chevron has imposed a greater discipline on political
voting than can be found in the domain of arbitrariness review. In our
data, at least, the speculation is rejected.
When politically mixed panels reviewed agency interpretations
under Chevron, the movement in validation rates of Republican appointees was not statistically significant, while for Democratic appointees it was an increase of 20 percentage points, which was statistically significant. " ' Interestingly, in arbitrariness review cases, Democratic appointees on mixed panels also show a statistically significant
response to the nature of the agency decision whiJe Republican appointees on mixed panels do not. Perhaps more importantly, the small
sample sizes preclude any strong inferences about whether the response of politically unanimous panels to the nature of the agency
decisions is larger under Chevron than under arbitrariness review.
Nonetheless, the results in Table 3 indicate that when the ideological
content of the agency decision is considered, the partisan composition
of panels exerts a substantial influence on judges' exercise of arbitrariness review.
4.

Conclusions.

The discussion of panel effects has been regrettably complex, but
the major conclusions are plain. In arbitrariness review cases, judicial
votes are significantly affected by the composition of the panel. The
political party of the appointing president is a good predictor of judicial behavior in such cases, and the political party of the president who
appointed the other two judges on the panel is also a strong predictor.
A key finding is that the more Democratic appointees on a panel, the
greater the likelihood that a panel will validate a liberal agency decision and the smaller the likelihood that it will validate a conservative
one. But perhaps our most striking finding here involves the reaction of
judges on politically uniform panels to the nature of the agency decisions. The willingness of judges on such panels to vote to validate an
agency decision under the arbitrariness standard correlates strongly with
the ideological direction of that decision. On RRR and DDD panels,
109 See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 855-58 (cited in note 39).
110 See id.
M1lSee id.
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judges are at least 20 percentage points more likely to reject an arbitrariness challenge when the agency decision fits with their presumed
ideologicalpreferences than when it does not. This finding suggests that
the influences of judicial ideology and panel composition exert approximately the same power in arbitrariness review as they do in review under Chevron.
D.

Liberal Voting, Conservative Voting
1. Liberal voting rates.

Another way to analyze the votes of the judges is to examine
whether their votes can be considered "liberal." We classified a judge's
vote as liberal if it was a vote either to validate a liberal agency decision
or to invalidate a conservative agency decision. Table 4 presents comparisons of the liberal voting rates of Democratic and Republican appointees. Column (1) of Table 4 shows the overall liberal voting rates of
Democratic and Republican appointees. Consistent with conventional
wisdom, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes far more frequently.
Democratic appointees vote in a liberal way 69 percent of the time,
which is about 13 percentage points higher than the percentage for Republican appointees. It is worth underlining the fact that we are concerned with judicial decisions striking down agency judgments of fact or
policy as arbitrary or unreasonable, where the convictions of federal
judges are not supposed to play a role. But in that domain, a 13 percentage point difference shows a significant effect from judicial preferences.
This pattern is comparable to the liberal voting rates in cases reviewing EPA and NLRB decisions under Chevron. In such cases, Democratic appointees voted in a liberal way 67 percent of the time, and
Republican appointees 50 percent of the time."2 The slightly lower
rate of liberal voting by Republican appointees in Chevron cases is
not statistically distinguishable from their rate of liberal voting in arbitrariness cases. The partisan gap in liberal voting in cases reviewing
agency decisions for arbitrariness is effectively identical to the gap in
cases applying Chevron.
The next two columns of Table 4 break down the liberal voting
rates according to the party of the current president. As seen previously, that party is a highly imprecise measure of the ideological content of the agency decisions in our data set. The final column of Table
4 shows that the liberal voting rates of both Democratic and Republican appointees rise by several percentage points when the party of the
current president changes. For Democratic appointees, the direction of
112

Id at 859.
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this movement is contrary to the standard prediction. That is, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes slightly less often during Democratic Presidencies. But the difference is small, about 5 percentage
points, and not statistically meaningful. The finding that Democratic
appointees vote in a more liberal fashion during the Republican Presidency is consistent with our earlier claim that many of the NLRB decisions during Republican administrations are relevantly liberal.
TABLE 4
LIBERAL VOTING RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES

INARBITRARINESS REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING
PRESIDENT AND BY PARTY OF CURRENT PRESIDENT
Party of current president
Total
(1)

Democrat
(2)

Republican
(3)

Difference
of (2)-(3)

Party of appointing president

(A) Democrat

(B) Republican
Difference of (A)-(B):

0.686

0.665

0.711

-0.045

(0.016)

(0.023)

(0.023)

(0.033)

[807]

[427]

[380]

0.552

0.520

0.589

-0.069**

(0.015)

(0.020)

(0.021)

(0.029)

[1,152]

[617]

[535]

0.134***

0.145***

0.122***

(0.022)

(0.031)

(0.032)

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level,
and *** denotes difference significant at 1 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

2. Panel effects.
Figure 3 presents liberal voting rates of the circuit judges by their
political party and by the partisan composition of the panel. The liberal
voting rates of Republican appointees are almost everywhere below
those of Democratic appointees, but they are highest when the panel
has a DDR configuration. In that setting, Republican appointees cast
liberal votes about 65 percent of the time, which is 9 percentage points
higher than when the panel has two Republican appointees and one
Democratic appointee. Moreover, Republican appointees cast liberal
votes most infrequently, 50 percent of the time, when the panel consists
of three Republicans. Both ideological dampening and amplification
thus characterize the liberal voting rates of Republican appointees.
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FIGURE 3
LIBERAL VOTING RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES
IN ARBITRARINESS REVIEW CASES BY PANEL COMPOSITION
AND BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT

80.0-

Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the lightly shaded
bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.

Democratic appointees also show fluctuation in their liberal voting rates. When a panel consists of three Democratic appointees, they
cast liberal votes 78 percent of the time-a rate that is 9 percentage
points higher than when the panel has two Democratic appointees
and one Republican appointee. Their liberal voting rates slip to 64
percent when the Democratic appointee sits with two Republican appointees. These movements are broadly consistent with familiar patterns in appellate decisionmaking. Compared to how a judge votes
when sitting with one Democratic appointee and one Republican appointee, a judge sitting with two Democratic appointees is more likely
to vote in a liberal way, and a judge sitting with two Republican appointees is less likely to vote in a liberal way. These patterns are
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known as ideological amplification, meaning "amplified" ideological
voting on RRR and DDD panels, and ideological dampening, meaning "dampened" ideological voting by Ds on DRR panels and by Rs
on RRR panels. Ideological amplification and ideological dampening
are evident in many areas of law, just as they are in the arbitrariness
review cases depicted in Figure 3."'
Interestingly, the amplification effect for Democratic appointees
appears slightly more pronounced than the dampening effect, while
the opposite appears true for Republican appointees. We do not have
an explanation for these intriguing differences in magnitude. Rather,
the primary lesson of Figure 3 is that ideological amplification and
dampening characterize the voting patterns of both sets of judges in
arbitrariness review cases.
These results are in many ways consistent with our findings for
Chevron cases, but some subtle differences are also present. Under
both standards of review, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes
more often than Republican appointees irrespective of the panel
composition, and the liberal voting rates of judges appointed by presidents of both parties fluctuates to some degree with panel composition. But in the Chevron cases, the liberal voting rates of Democratic
appointees, rather than Republican appointees, are more responsive
to panel composition." The liberal voting rates of Democratic appointees in Chevron cases climb steadily as the number of Democratic
appointees on a panel grow."' The liberal voting rates of Republican
appointees under Chevron are steady as long as Republican appointees form a majority of judges on the panel, and they dip when a Republican appointee sat with two Democratic appointees. While these
patterns invite speculations about the differences between the two
standards of review, the noisiness of the estimates prevents us from
drawing strong inferences.
III. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DIsTRICr OF COLUMBIA

In view of its importance and its specialized docket, which consists in large part of regulatory problems, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia is the appellate court most frequently studied by
administrative law scholars and political scientists. 6 Precisely because
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See Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?at 54-56 (cited in note 104).
See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 860-61 (cited in note 39).
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See id.
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See generally, for example, Revesz, 38 Va L Rev 1717 (cited in note 34); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarity on the Districtof Columbia
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of its distinctive role, a natural question is whether the voting behavior
of DC Circuit judges is representative. To what degree does the
unique nature of the DC Circuit lead it to perform in distinctive ways?
This Part provides some answers. Our most important findings are
that the validation rate on the DC Circuit is significantly lower than
the validation rate elsewhere, and that the court as a whole shows conservative voting patterns-so much so that Democratic appointees on
the DC Circuit show voting patterns akin to those of Republican appointees elsewhere.
A. Three Initial Findings
Table 5 reports the rates at which Democratic and Republican
appointees to the District of Columbia and other circuits vote to validate decisions of the EPA and the NLRB. Three aspects of these validation rates are immediately apparent. First, despite its specialized
docket, the DC Circuit accounts for only 187 of the 653 cases, or somewhat less than a third of the total. This is a significantly lower share
than in judicial applications of Chevron. Of the 227 challenges to the
EPA and the NLRB under Chevron over the same time period, the
DC Circuit decided 109 of them, or 48 percent.
Second, the final row of Table 5 shows that in both the DC Circuit
and other circuits, the overall validation rates of Democratic appointees are higher than those of Republican appointees. In the DC Circuit,
Democratic appointees vote to validate at a rate about 8 percentage
points higher than that of their Republican colleagues, while in other
circuits, they do so at a rate about 11 percentage points higher. The pervasiveness of this partisan gap is meaningful, but the intercircuit difference of 3 percentage points (that is, 8 versus 11) is not. Democratic appointees both within and outside of the DC Circuit voted to validate
agency decisions significantly more often than Republican appointees.
The third finding is the most interesting. The final column of Table 5 shows that both Democratic and Republican appointees to the
DC Circuit are much less willing to validate the decisions of the EPA
and the NLRB in arbitrariness cases than are judges in other circuits.
The Democratic appointees to the DC Circuit were 9 percentage
points less likely to validate than their counterparts in other circuits,
while for Republicans the difference was slightly smaller, 6 percentage
points. This contrast is striking both for its size and for its consistency
across partisan affiliations.

Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L J 300; Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit,and the Supreme Court, 1978 S Ct Rev 345.
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TABLE 5
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN ARBITRARINESS
REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT AND BY CIRCUIT
Circuit court of appeals
District of
All other
Columbia
circuits
Difference
(1)
(2)
of (1)-(2)
Party of appointing president
(A) Democrat

0.634
(0.032)
[232]

0.725
(0.018)
[575]

-0.092**
(0.036)

(B) Republican

0.552
(0.028)
[328]

0.614
(0.017)
[824]

-0.067*
(0.032)

0.082*
(0.042)

0.111***
(0.026)

Difference of (A)-(B):

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: *denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, **denotes difference significant at 5 percent level, and
***denotes difference significant at I percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

B.

Of Familiarity and Contempt

A promising explanation of these differences is the greater experience of DC Circuit judges in reviewing administrative agencies.
With the exception of a very few judges whose tenure on the bench
only briefly overlapped with our sample period, every DC Circuit
judge in this period appears at least two dozen times in our data."' The
median number of votes in our data from such DC Circuit judges is
53, and the mean is 52.2. Outside of the DC Circuit, judges hear arbitrariness challenges to EPA and NLRB decisions far less frequently.
The median number of judges deciding cases involving the EPA and
the NLRB is 2, and the mean is 4.1. "8If we were to calculate the me-

117 Judges who left the DC Circuit relatively early in our observation period are Judges

James Buckley, Patricia Wald, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and those who joined it
relatively late are Judges Janice Rogers Brown and Thomas Griffith. Then-Judge John Roberts is
both a late arrival and an early departure in our data. The mean number of votes from each of
these judges is 8.1 and the median is 6.
118 Another example of this difference is the gap between the judges in our sample who
have decided the most hard look reviews of the EPA and the NLRB. The DC Circuit judge in
our data who voted in the most arbitrariness review cases, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson,
heard sixty-six of them. Outside of the DC Circuit, the judge in our data who sat on the most
hard look cases, Judge Joel Flaum in the Seventh Circuit, heard twenty-five of them. Close behind Judge Flaum were his Seventh Circuit colleagues Judges Diane Wood and Ilana Rovner,
each with twenty-four cases.
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dian number of relevant EPA and NLRB cases heard by the typical
appellate judge outside the DC Circuit, it would likely be zero because many judges never sit on cases requiring arbitrariness review
and thus never appear in our data.
Judges who are experienced in conducting arbitrariness review
might well become harder reviewers. With greater experience, judges
may grow more confident in their own judgments about what is arbitrary and thus may be more willing to invalidate agency decisions. In
addition to having greater experience with hard look review generally,
judges may be more willing to invalidate if they have previously reviewed the decisions of a specific agency. Familiarity may not necessarily breed contempt, but repeated play should allow judges to learn
where particular agencies are prone to weaknesses in their procedures
or their analyses. It is reasonable to speculate that the higher invalidation rates in the DC Circuit, for both Democratic and Republican appointees, are at least partly explained in these terms.
C.

Disaggregations
1. Validation rates.

Table 6 breaks down the comparison of the DC Circuit and other
circuits by the ideological content of the agency decision. The standard
seesaw pattern-in which the validation rates of Democratic appointees are higher than those of Republican appointees when the agency
decision is liberal (and the opposite occurs when the agency decision
is conservative)-is found only outside of the DC Circuit.
For DC Circuit judges, the validation rates of Republican appointees appear more responsive to the ideological content of the
agency decision than those of their Democratic colleagues. Panel A
shows that when the agency decision is liberal rather than conservative, the validation rates of Democratic appointees differ by only 4
percentage points. Moreover, this movement in the validation rates of
Democratic appointees-higher when the agency decision is conservative-is contrary to the predicted direction. Too much should not be
made of this slight increase because the number of cases in our data in
which the DC Circuit reviewed conservative agency decision is small.
The main conclusion is that the validation rates of Democratic appointees to the DC Circuit do not show the predictable ideological
pattern. For Republican appointees on the DC Circuit, the difference
in validation of conservative rather than liberal agency decisions is in
the predicted direction and quite large-nearly 20 percentage points!
On the DC Circuit, Republican appointees appear to show far more
ideological voting than do Democratic appointees.
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For judges on other circuits, the opposite is true. Panel B shows
that when the agency decision is liberal, Democratic appointees validate at a very high rate, 76 percent, and when the agency decision is
not liberal, their validation rate falls to 51 percent, a drop of 25 percentage points. The nature of the agency decision also has a sizable
impact on the validation rates of Republican appointees. Republican
appointees on appellate courts other than the DC Circuit vote to validate liberal agency decisions under hard look review about 60 percent
of the time and conservative decisions about 72 percent of the time.
The difference for Republican appointees outside the DC Circuit of
12 percentage points is about half as large as the 25 point difference
for Democratic appointees -but it is still statistically significant.
In sum, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees both inside and outside of the DC Circuit appear to respond
to the ideological direction of the agency decisions. These responses
produce the now-familiar seesawing of validation rates. Democratic
appointees vote to validate at higher rates than Republicans when the
agency decision is liberal, and vice versa when the agency decision is
conservative. A general conclusion is that the influence of judges' political commitments on arbitrariness review is not limited to any particular circuit court.
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TABLE 6
VALIDATION RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN ARBITRARINESS
REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT,
BY IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF AGENCY DECISION, AND BY CIRCUIT

PanelA
CircuitCourt of Appeals for the Districtof Columbia
Ideological content of agency decision
Liberal
(1)

Not liberal
(2)

Difference
of (1)-(2)

(A) Democrat

0.629
(0.034)
[205]

0.667
(0.092)
[27]

-0.037
(0.099)

(B) Republican

0.531
(0.029)
[292]

0.722
(0.076)
[36]

-0.191**
(0.087)

0.098**
(0.045)

-0.056
(0.119)

Party of appointing president

Difference of (A)-(B):

PanelB
Other Circuit Courts of Appeals
Ideological content of agency decision
Liberal
(1)

Not liberal
(2)

Difference
of (1)-(2)

(A) Democrat

0.759
(0.019)
[498]

0.506
(0.057)
[77]

0.253***
(0.054)

(B) Republican

0.603
(0.018)
[745]

0.722
(0.051)
[79]

-0.119**
(0.058)

0.156***
(0.027)

-0.215**
(0.076)

Party of appointing president

Difference of (A)-(B):

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level, and
** denotes difference significant at 1 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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2. Liberal and conservative voting.
A possible explanation for the lower validation rates of DC Circuit judges is that they are simply more conservative than their colleagues on other circuits. The relative lack of responsiveness of Democratic appointees on the DC Circuit to the ideological content of
the agency decision - as shown in Table 5-also suggests that Democratic appointees to that court may be more conservative than Democratic appointees on other courts of appeals.
To test this hypothesis, Table 7 presents comparisons for liberal
voting rates. The table reveals that in addition to having higher invalidation rates, DC Circuit judges-of both parties-are significantly
more conservative than judges of other circuits in their voting patterns
in arbitrariness cases. Republican appointees to the DC Circuit cast
liberal votes less often than their counterparts in other circuits by about
7 percentage points. The difference for Democratic appointees is almost
double that: the average Democratic appointee to the DC Circuit casts
liberal votes in these arbitrariness review cases about 13 percentage
points less often than do Democratic appointees in other circuits.
TABLE 7
LIBERAL VOTING RATES OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN
ARBITRARINESS REVIEW CASES BY PARTY OF
APPOINTING PRESIDENT AND BY CIRCUIT

Circuit court of appeals
District of
Columbia

All other
circuits

Difference

(1)

(2)

of (1)-(2)

0.595
(0.032)

0.723
(0.019)

-0.129***
(0.034)

[232]

[575]

0.503
(0.027)
[328]

0.572
(0.017)
[824]

0.092**
(0.043)

0.152**
(0.026)

Party of appointing president
(A) Democrat

(B) Republican
Difference of (A)-(B):

-0.069**
(0.032)

Means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10 percent level, ** denotes difference significant at 5 percent level, and
• denotes difference significant at 1 percent level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Yet the lower liberal voting rates of DC Circuit judges do not imply that Democratic and Republican appointees on the DC Circuit are
equally conservative. In both the DC Circuit and other circuits, De-

mocratic appointees vote in the liberal manner more often than Re-
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publican appointees. This partisan gap is about 9 percentage points in
the DC Circuit and 15 percentage points in other circuits, but the 6
point difference between these two figures is not statistically significant. We cannot conclude that the partisan gap is larger on other circuits, but we readily infer that Democratic appointees on all appellate
courts cast liberal votes more often in arbitrariness review of EPA and
NLRB decisions than Republican appointees do. We will explore
shortly a complexity with drawing some tempting conclusions from
this finding; for the moment, let us continue with the numbers.
While a partisan gap remains within each circuit, the lower liberal
voting rates of Democratic appointees on the DC Circuit can be further illustrated by comparing them to Republican appointees in other
circuits. Put differently, does the average Democratic appointee to the
DC Circuit have liberal voting rates as low as the average Republican
appointee to another circuit court? Table 7 shows, strikingly, that the
answer is "yes." On the DC Circuit, Democratic appointees cast liberal
votes 60 percent of the time, while Republicans on other circuits did
so 57 percent of the time. The 3 percentage point difference between
these figures is not statistically different from zero. At least in terms of
this set of arbitrariness review opinions, DC Circuit Democrats behave like Republicans on other federal appellate courts. A look back
at Table 5 reveals that these two groups of judges are also indistinguishable in terms of their validation rates in these cases. On the DC
Circuit, Democratic appointees voted to validate the agency decisions
63 percent of the time, while Republican appointees on other circuits
did so 61 percent of the time.
We have referred to a complexity in interpreting these findings,
and it is easy to describe: arbitrariness cases in the DC Circuit might
be relevantly different from arbitrariness cases in other courts of appeals. In some cases, the DC Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review
EPA action, and pragmatic constraints might ensure that "liberal" challenges to agency action are relatively weak and that "conservative"
challenges to agency action are relatively strong. In other cases, litigants
might decide to bring particular cases in the DC Circuit, or decide not
to do so, and these selection effects might defeat easy comparisons. We
have therefore spoken of differences in liberal voting rates without
drawing strong conclusions about whether DC Circuit judges are more
conservative in the abstract. Because the mix of cases in the DC Circuit
is not a random sample, our evidence is merely suggestive.
Nonetheless, the central lessons are plain. In cases challenging
EPA and NLRB decisions for arbitrariness, judges on the DC Circuit
vote to invalidate agency decisions more readily than do their counterparts on other circuits. Both Democratic and Republican appointees to the DC Circuit show lower liberal voting rates than do their
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counterparts on other circuits. At the same time, the partisan gap between Democratic and Republican appointees does not lessen: in both
the DC and other circuits, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes in
arbitrariness review cases significantly more often than Republican
appointees. In terms of their liberal voting rates, Democratic appointees
to the DC Circuit are equivalent to Republican appointees to other
courts of appeals.
IV. NORMATIVE ISSUES

We now turn to normative issues. It is tempting to think that an
understanding of validation rates and of the role of judicial ideology
would bear on and perhaps even resolve the continuing debate over
hard look review. And in the end, we conclude that our findings can
reasonably be taken to suggest the importance of diminishing that
role and also provide significant ammunition for those who believe
that such review should be softened. "9 But this lesson is heavily qualified, and the qualifications may be as important as the ultimate conclusion. The less ambiguous lesson is that it would be highly desirable
to reduce the role of judicial policy preferences in conducting arbitrariness review.
A. Problems and Puzzles
Let us begin with the validation rate. In arbitrariness cases, the
validation rate is 64 percent."" Some people might find that rate alarmingly low. After all, agencies are supposed to lose not when they are
wrong but when their judgments of policy and fact are "arbitrary" (or
lacking substantial evidence). An invalidation rate of 36 percent seems
quite high.
To make progress on the normative issues, suppose we found that
the validation rate was lower than it actually is-say, 30 percent.
Would it be appropriate to conclude that the hard look doctrine was
too hard? At first glance, the answer would clearly be affirmative. If
courts are striking down agency decisions as arbitrary more than half of
the time, there is reason to suspect that something is seriously amiss.
But for two reasons, the suspicion might turn out to be wrong.
Perhaps more than half of the agency decisions are, in fact, arbitrary. If
119 See, for example, Pierce, 47 Admin L Rev at 65 (cited in note 30) (arguing that court
interpretations have transformed the efficient process envisioned by the APA into an overly
inefficient and ineffectual process).
120 We have explored NLRB and EPA cases here, but we have also compiled a different data
set involving all decisions citing State Farm. When including all such cases, the validation rate is
under 60 percent. See generally Miles and Sunstein, The Hard Look in Practice (cited in note 76).
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so, the invalidation rate is nothing to deplore. But there is a more subtle point. As we have suggested, ' the rate of challenges to agency action will be affected by whether judicial review is aggressive or weak.
If courts are aggressive, we should expect to see more challenges, simply because the likelihood of success is higher. If the rate of challenges
varies with the stringency of judicial review, then we might hypothesize that it would hover around a fairly constant level-as a first approximation, 50 percent (not so far from the overall rate that we in
fact find). In other words, the rate of validation might be impervious
to changes in the stringency of review.
To see why this is a plausible hypothesis, imagine that the stringency of judicial review was reduced, in the next five years, by about
half-so that the validation rate would be 82 percent, all else equal, in
five years. The difficulty is that the mix of cases would be most
unlikely to remain constant. If litigants are rational, the likelihood of
success will affect their decision whether to litigate, and that likelihood will depend on the aggressiveness of arbitrariness review. In all
probability, many challenges that would have been brought would no
longer be brought, simply because such challenges would be a waste
of time and money. Even if the stringency of judicial review was cut in
half, the overall validation rate could remain 64 percent. On certain
assumptions about litigant behavior, less stringent review could even
produce a lower validation rate, if, for example, only very strong cases
were brought. (Hence the relatively higher validation rate for the EPA
than for the NLRB may tell us less than first appears.)
Actually things are more complicated still. Agency decisions should
also be affected by the likelihood of judicial invalidation. Consider the
extreme case of no review, at all, of agency judgments about policy
and fact. Without any such review, some agencies would inevitably
make some decisions that they will not now make; the rate of arbitrariness would significantly increase. Of course it is likely that arbitrary decisions are already checked by nonjudicial safeguards of various sorts,'22 and we could imagine a world in which the level of arbitrariness would be very low even without judicial review. But in our
world, it is more than reasonable to think that judicial review operates
to discourage some decisions, actually or arguably arbitrary, that
would be made in its absence."3 If this is true, then it is also more than
See note 93 and accompanying text.
Consider, for example, the process of internal executive branch review. See Breyer, et al,
Administrative Law at 102-13 (cited in note 27) (describing presidential checks on agency policy
through executive orders establishing presidential oversight groups).
123 See Pederson, 85 Yale L J at 59-60 (cited in note 5) (contending that aggressive judicial
review has helped to discipline arbitrary decisions by the EPA).
121
122
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reasonable to think that aggressive review will discourage more decisions than weak review. And if this is true, then aggressive review will
operate as a check on its own use. With such review, the mix of agency
decisions will shift in the direction of less arbitrariness, and hence the
rate of invalidation might well stay constant.
The analysis is analogous to that of the selection of disputes for
litigation. In the standard account, the only disputes that advance to
trial are those in which each party is sufficiently optimistic about her
chance for success at trial that her estimated return from trial exceeds
the difference between trial costs and settlement costs. Less optimistic
litigants will choose to settle." Arbitrariness review differs in many
ways from trials, but the relevant insight is that both the rate of challenges to agency decisions and the content of agency decisions will
respond to the intensity of judicial review.
We can therefore identify two ways in which changes in the intensity of judicial review will influence the case mix: as review becomes
less intense, litigants will challenge fewer decisions and agencies will
be more likely to make decisions that aggressive courts would have
struck down as arbitrary. In terms of validation rates, the two effects
will cut in different directions. Fewer challenges will mean lower validation rates; agency adaptation, in the form of decisions closer to the
line of arbitrariness, will mean higher ones.
To know the ultimate consequences of less intense review, we
need to know not only the direction but also the magnitude of these
two effects. A reduction in the intensity of review should first tend to
raise the validation rate. If neither litigants nor agencies were responsive to the intensity of review, an increase in the validation rate would
be the sole consequence of less intense review. But if litigants were
highly responsive to intensity shifts and if agencies were not, the content of agency decisions would remain the same while litigants would
decline to bring the more marginal challenges. The volume of arbitrariness challenges would decline, and the validation rate could remain fairly constant. Or the validation rate could even fall as litigants
found it worthwhile to challenge only agency decisions that were most
egregiously wrong and thus most likely to be invalidated.
124 Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 12-13 (cited in note 93). A strong version of the
Priest-Klein hypothesis predicts that under certain circumstances the win rate of plaintiffs at trial
approaches 50 percent. We do not consider the fact that the validation rate in our EPA and
NLRB cases hovers near 50 percent to be evidence for this proposition because the conditions
for the Priest-Klein result are not satisfied in State Farm cases. Most important, the stakes in
judicial review of agency decisions-however the relevant figures might be defined-are unlikely
to be symmetrical between plaintiffs and defendants. Just one of the several possible ways in
which the stakes may be asymmetric is that the agency, as a policymaking institution, may have
greater concern for the precedential effect of the litigation than an individual litigant.
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Suppose, however, that litigants were not responsive to intensity
shifts and agencies were highly responsive. If so, then agencies might
issue more arbitrary decisions without suffering a reduction in the
validation rate and without inducing an increased flow of challenges.
But if the agency let the quality of its decisions decline too much, the
greater arbitrariness of decisions would eventually offset the reduction in the intensity of judicial review. In this instance, the volume of
challenges might rise and the validation rate might fall. If both litigants and agencies were highly responsive to intensity shifts, the impact on the quality of agency decisions, the volume of challenges, and
the validation rate would be far from clear. Without strong assumptions about whether litigants or agencies are more responsive to the
intensity of judicial review, the overall impact on the validation rate is
hard to foresee. These predictions are captured in Table 8.
It follows that in the abstract, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the stringency of review, and about whether existing practice is too lenient or too stringent, from any particular validation rate.
In the future, much progress might be made by examining the rate of
challenges to decisions by particular agencies or agencies in generalan eminently feasible enterprise. What percentage of EPA rules is actually challenged? Is the percentage higher now than it was five years
ago, or ten years ago, or fifteen years ago? Still more progress might
be made by a qualitative assessment of the nature and rationality of
agency decisions over time- also feasible even if more difficult.
TABLE 8
EFFECTS OF REDUCED INTENSITY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW ON VALIDATION RATES

Are the litigantsresponsive?
Yes
No

B.

Is the agency responsive?
Yes
No
Ambiguous impact
No change
on validation rate
(or lower validation rate)
No change
Higher validation rate
(or lower validation rate)

Republican Appointees, Democratic Appointees, and the
Smoking Gun
At this point, the validation rates that we observe might be taken to
be insufficiently informative about whether courts are reviewing agency
decisions too aggressively. But we are particularly interested in party and
panel effects, and we should be able to learn more if we attend to the
differences between Republican and Democratic appointees.
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To focus the analysis, suppose that Republican appointees voted
to invalidate liberal agency decisions 90 percent of the time and to
invalidate conservative agency decisions 10 percent of the time-and
that Democratic appointees showed the opposite pattern. Or suppose
that Republican appointees showed an 80 percent validation rate during Republican administrations and a 20 percent validation rate during
Democratic administrations- and that Democratic appointees showed
a similar form of favoritism. At first glance, voting patterns of this kind
would suggest a serious problem in the real world of arbitrariness review.
If these were the observed patterns, then we might be tempted to
say that when an agency decision is invalidated as arbitrary, it is not
always because it is genuinely arbitrary. On the contrary, it may well
be because the court would have preferred the agency to do otherwise. At least this is so when Republican appointees vote to strike
down liberal decisions or those in Democratic administrations, and
when Democratic appointees vote to strike down conservative decisions or those in Republican administrations.
Even here, however, it is necessary to be careful. Suppose that
Republican appointees strike down liberal agency decisions at a much
higher rate than conservative agency decisions. By itself, does this fact
demonstrate bias? The answer is that it does not. Perhaps liberal
agency decisions are especially likely to be arbitrary. And if Democratic appointees are peculiarly likely to strike down EPA decisions
under Republican presidents, it may be because such decisions are
indeed arbitrary. After finding an asymmetrical pattern of votes within
any particular group of appointees, we might well be suspicious of
ideological bias on the part of the judiciary. But in truth, no such suspicion has been vindicated by that kind of pattern.
The smoking gun, we think, is the seesaw pattern found in Table 1-the fact that Republican validation rates jump from 58 percent
to 72 percent when the agency decision becomes conservative, just as
the Democratic validation rates fall from 72 percent to 55 percent
when the agency decision becomes conservative. It cannot be the case
that both camps are bias-free, simply responding to what any objective
observer would deem arbitrary. The existence of ideological amplification sharpens this claim. If Democratic appointees show a greater rate
of liberal voting when sitting with two Democratic appointees, and if
Republican appointees show a greater rate of conservative voting
when sitting with two Republican appointees, then something does
seem seriously wrong.
To be sure, it is possible that one group is essentially neutral and
right and that the other group is not. But it would be surprising if this
possibility could be confirmed by an independent observer who was
both neutral and right. The best conclusion is that in its operation, ar-
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bitrariness review is significantly affected by the ideological dispositions of federal judges in a way that produces serious errors in light of
the aspirations of State Farm itself. Recall that the most fundamental
justification of hard look review is that with the grant of broad discretionary power to regulatory agencies, a firm judicial check is necessary
as a kind of second-best substitute for insistence on the safeguards of
the original constitutional system.' If the consequence of that firm
check is to give effect to the policy commitments of federal judges, the
cure seems worse than the disease.
Notice, however, that our data show a large but not massive difference between Republican and Democratic appointees. It is not as if
Republican appointees have a 10 percent validation rate when the
agency decision is liberal and a 90 percent validation rate when the
agency decision is conservative. On the contrary, Republican appointees vote to validate most liberal agency decisions, and Democratic
appointees vote to validate most conservative agency decisions. A defender of the status quo, seeking to minimize the role of judicial policy
preferences, might respond with the suggestion that the evidence is
compatible with the view that State Farm has disciplined the judicial
role, ensuring as it has that Republican and Democratic appointees
generally agree with one another.
We strongly agree with this suggestion insofar as it is meant to
suggest that our data demonstrate that judicial ideology is not playing
a dominant role and that judicial policy choices are not driving arbitrariness review. A crudely "realist" picture of existing practice is
wildly inconsistent with reality. Nonetheless, judicial policy preferences do play a significant role, and in the difficult cases, it does seem
to be driving actual outcomes. Something is seriously amiss if Republican appointees are significantly more likely to uphold conservative
agency decisions than liberal agency decisions and if Democratic appointees show the opposite pattern. We cannot rule out the possibility
that one group has it essentially right. But it is not possible that both
groups have it essentially right, and we suspect that errors can be
found from both sides.
C.

Too Few Invalidations? Of Suspicion and Loyalty

At this stage, politically motivated invalidations might seem to be
the most serious problem. But a different reading of our findings is
imaginable. Perhaps the problem is not that appointees of both parties
For discussion, see Sunstein, 1983 S Ct Rev at 181-84 (cited in note 20) (describing the
procedural and substantive components of the hard look doctrine). See also text accompanying
notes 7-9.
125
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vote, with some regularity, to invalidate decisions with which they
might be expected to be unsympathetic. Perhaps the real problem is
that appointees of both parties vote, with some regularity, to uphold
the decisions of agencies with which they might be expected to be
sympathetic. Perhaps the real problem, uncovered by our data, is not
politically driven suspicion but instead politically driven loyalty or at
least sympathy. On this view, what is most troubling, and what emerges
as the real story here, is the high rates of validation, by judges nominated by a president of one or another party, of agency decisions that
those judges might be expected to find agreeable.
Nothing in our data excludes this possibility. If the challenged
agency decisions are often arbitrary, perhaps it is disturbing to see that
Democratic appointees vote to uphold liberal decisions and that Republican appointees vote to uphold conservative decisions. Perhaps it
is affirmatively desirable to find a high level of invalidations; perhaps
the correct rulings are those by Republican appointees of liberal decisions and those by Democratic appointees of conservative decisions.
In a world in which agency arbitrariness is pervasive, politically driven
validations would indeed be the problem.
Even if this is the correct reading of the data, and if validations
rather than invalidations are the problem, the existing pattern of outcomes cannot be defended. If the real world of arbitrariness review
includes a significant degree of political voting, leading to an unduly
high validation rate, the appropriate correction is a "harder look," in
the form of a general increase in judicial scrutiny. Moreover, we suspect that this is not the appropriate correction. If Democratic appointees are striking down conservative decisions at a higher rate than
liberal decisions, and if Republican appointees are doing the same
with liberal decisions, it would be surprising to find that all or most of
the invalidated decisions are genuinely "arbitrary" within ordinary
understandings of that term while also finding that the validated decisions are genuinely not "arbitrary." Most of the cases in our data involve complex questions of fact and policy on which reasonable people can differ. But we do not deny the potential value of a more systematic inquiry into the possibility that politically driven validations
are a real problem.
D. What Should Be Done? Of Decision Costs and Error Costs
How do our findings bear on the continuing debate over arbi1 The first point is that questions about such review
trariness review? 26
126 See, for example, Pierce, 47 Admin L Rev at 65 (cited in note 30) (arguing that "courts
have transformed the simple, efficient notice and comment process into an extraordinarily
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cannot be settled in the abstract. Imagine, for example, a parallel
world in which agency decisions are almost never arbitrary and never
especially harmful even when arbitrary. Imagine that in such a world,

judicial review of arbitrariness would produce more, not less, in the
way of arbitrariness, simply because judicial decisions are replete with
bias and suffer from a lack of expertise and accountability. In that
world, there is no point to arbitrariness review. By hypothesis, such

review would make the situation worse rather than better. These are
claims about the costs of errors; perhaps arbitrariness review increases
those costs. At the same time, judicial review increases the costs of
decisions, simply because it adds an additional layer, and possibly
more than that, of decisional burdens on all sides.

Some people, in some periods, have believed that the United States
is not so far from this imaginary world.' At the very least, it is possible
to find periods in which prominent voices suggest that aggressive judicial review of agency judgments of policy and fact is likely to cause serious problems. ' The New Deal period is a prominent example;'29 the
same is true of the period after the election of President Reagan.
At the same time, we could easily imagine another and quite different parallel world, in which agency decisions are distinctly susceptible to the influences of self-interested private groups, or otherwise a
product of bias and confusion. In that world, we might also suppose

that federal courts would provide an important ex post corrective and
ex ante deterrent to biased and confused decisions.m In such a world,
stringent judicial review of agency judgments of fact and policy would
be easy to defend.

lengthy, complicated, and expensive process"); Mashaw and Harfst, Auto Safety at 95 (cited in
note 10) (asserting that hard look review prevented the NHTSA from implementing its regulatory plan); Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 363 (cited in note 10) (advocating analysis and reform of
doctrine requiring judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute but more thorough review of an agency's factual and policy determinations).
127 See, for example, Mashaw and Harfst, Auto Safety at 249 (cited in note 10) (contending
that the courts' tendency to "proceduralize" their judicial review of agency rulemaking has "imposed a debilitating, defensive posture on agency standard setting").
128 See, for example, id at 95 (describing how the NHTSA largely "abandoned" its new
regulatory plan after negative outcomes in court cases); James M. Landis, The Administrative
Process 154-55 (Yale 1938) (arguing that, although judges are "experts in the synthesis of design," they are not experts in other modem disciplines and so should apply deferential review to
agency policymaking done by experts).
129 See Breyer, et al, Administrative Law at 19-20 (cited in note 27) (describing New Deal-era
arguments that judicial decisions limiting regulatory power "were obstructing the popular will
and thwarting the economic survival of the nation").
130 See Pederson, 85 Yale L J at 59-60 (cited in note 5) (claiming that internal review is not
as effective as aggressive judicial review).
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We can identify prominent voices, in prominent periods, suggesting that this understanding is not so far from reality.31 The enactment
of the APA was based on concerns about agency bias and relative en-

thusiasm for judicial review."' Indeed, the post-New Deal strengthening of substantial evidence review resulted from the Supreme Court's

recognition of Congress's expression of a "mood" in favor of a more
aggressive approach from the courts. " ' The rise of the hard look doc-

trine in the 1960s and 1970s was founded on similar assumptions about
the value of judicial review in correcting agency errors and bias."' Fearful of agency "capture," prominent judges defended the doctrine as a

method for increasing agency accountability by ensuring attention to
the claims of a range of relevant interests, and also as a method of promoting the application of technical expertise to difficult problems."' For
their part, skeptics pointed to the risk that hard look review would

discourage agency rulemaking and reflect judicial bias on the merits.6
Our own findings demonstrate that judicial commitments are
playing a significant role-and suggest the strong possibility that in
many cases, judges are voting to invalidate agency decisions as arbitrary when they would not do so if their own predilections were otherwise. To the extent that this is so, there is a new argument for a
softer look-that is, one that would ensure that agency decisions would
be invalidated as arbitrary only when diverse judges could agree that
they should be invalidated for that reason. We have a degree of confi131 See, for example, Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev at 536-37 (cited in note 2) (worrying that
agencies will create policies by highly informal means without adequately synthesizing the record if courts do not prod them).
132 See Breyer, et al, Administrative Law at 20-21 (cited in note 27) (describing the passage
of the APA as a compromise addressing "the largest perceived problem: administrative discretion"); UniversalCamera, 340 US at 477-87 (highlighting the congressional history and widespread
dissatisfaction with the abilities of courts to review procedures used by administrative bodies).
133 See Universal Camera, 340 US at 487 (asserting that this "mood" is evident in both the
legislative history and the legislation itself).
134 See Sunstein, 1983 S Ct Rev at 177 (cited in note 20) (contending that as a result of the
New Deal and the post-World War II growth of the "vast administrative apparatus," a need for
agency discipline emerged beyond the inadequate political supervision in place).
135 See, for example, Leventhal, 122 U Pa L Rev at 555 (cited in note 2) (arguing that judicial review of agency decisions adds a degree of "effective supervision with restraint" and ensures that agencies take congressional mandates into account). Compare Ethyl Corp v EPA, 541
F2d 1, 67 (DC Cir 1976) (Bazelon concurring) (advocating that judicial attention should be focused
on procedural rather than substantive matters), with id at 68-69 (Leventhal concurring) (arguing
that judges cannot abstain from substantive review, even in technical matters, because courts
have a congressionally mandated responsibility to ensure that agency decisionmaking is not
irrational or discriminatory).
136 See, for example, Mashaw and Harfst, Auto Safety at 149-51 (cited in note 10); Melnick,
Regulation and the Courts at 11 (cited in note 31) (asserting that judges "have become increasingly willing to second-guess agencies... especially when they fear the agency lacks aggressiveness in pursuing its statutory mission").
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dence in the result when conservative decisions are invalidated by
panels of RRD and RRR; we also have such confidence when liberal
decisions are invalidated by panels of DDR and DDD. The troublesome cases involve invalidations that "fit" with the presumed ideology
of the majority of judges on the relevant panel.' And indeed, we have
found disturbing patterns of that kind on the courts of appeals. But as
we have acknowledged, it is also possible to be troubled by validations
that fit with the presumed ideology of that same majority of judges.
We might add that we have a degree of confidence in validations from
DDR and DRR panels, and from DDD and RRR panels, that are inconsistent with political expectations-but that there is room for concern when an RRR panel upholds a conservative decision and when a
DDD panel upholds a liberal one.
It would therefore be possible to take our findings to support two
different positions. The first is that judicial review should generally be
weakened, so as to diminish the risk that invalidations reflect political
commitments on the part of the relevant judges. The second is that
steps should be taken to reduce the risks associated with potentially
partisan validations or invalidations -as, for example, when DDD
panels regularly uphold liberal agency decisions and when RRR panels show a special willingness to strike down such decisions. The second position seems to us more securely grounded in the evidence. It is
certainly possible to fear that a general softening of judicial review
would reduce a valuable ex post corrective and ex ante deterrent to
arbitrary decisions-a fear to which our data do not speak.
Our findings also generate a clear prediction: when a judiciary
dominated by the appointees of a Republican president reviews liberal agency decisions, or when a judiciary dominated by Democratic
appointees reviews conservative agency decisions, the invalidation
rate will increase. This prediction suggests that the debate over State
Farm should consider the temporal effects of judicial policy preferences. The life tenure of federal judges implies that partisan imbalances in the appellate courts may persist for long periods. An unbalanced federal judiciary might well act as a brake on agencies' ability
to implement the liberal or conservative policies of a new executive.

Consider Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of Appeals, 107 Yale L J 2155,2172 (1998)
(finding that unified panels show particular partisanship in the predicted ideological direction in
a sample of Chevron cases).
138 Consider Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum L
Rev 1, 49-50 (2008) (arguing, in the context of the preclearancc procedures of the Voting Rights
Act, that partisan influence in the DOJ may be more variable over time than judicial partisanship).
137
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The intensity of arbitrariness review can conspire with the life tenure
of judges to make the effects of judicial ideology enduring.
It is not clear whether large-scale reforms are desirable. But several lessons do seem plain. At a minimum, the argument for Supreme
Court review is strengthened in arbitrariness cases in which the outcome fits with the predicted ideological dispositions of unified panels.
So too, those circumstances present unusually strong arguments for en
banc review. A parallel lesson is more subtle and perhaps more important. If appellate judges are made aware that the evidence suggests a
degree of ideological voting in arbitrariness review, perhaps that very
awareness can operate as a kind of corrective or inoculation. In fact, our
hope is that lawyers' and judges' understanding of the data might help
to reduce the relevant effects in the future.
More generally, there might well be a fresh reason to revisit the
current hard look review as a means of reducing the risk that agency
decisions will be deemed arbitrary simply because judges do not agree
with them on the merits. Remarkably, the Supreme Court has issued
no major pronouncements about arbitrariness review since State Farm
itself. Its next encounter with the topic could provide a context for
directing significant cautionary notes to the courts of appeals.
We could also imagine more dramatic responses. Here, as elsewhere, there is reason to prefer mixed to unified panels, as a way of
reducing the risk of ideologically driven outcomes.' In an important
context, Congress has made exactly this choice, ensuring that the independent agencies may have no more than a bare majority of commissioners from the same political party.' ' For example, the NLRB,
the FTC, the FCC, and the SEC must have at least two Republican
members (of five) under Democratic presidents, and at least two Democratic members under Republican presidents.' This requirement
might well operate to reduce the risks of ideological outcomes that
would arise if adjudicative bodies consisted only of Republican or
Democratic appointees. Note that the NLRB is one of our two principal agencies in the current study and that the NLRB makes almost all
of its law and policy through adjudication, construing the provisions of

139 James Stribopoulos and Moin A. Yahya, Does a Judge's Party of Appointment or Gender
Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario,45 Osgoode
Hall L J 315, 362-63 (2007) (stressing the importance of diverse panels of judges with regard to
party and gender); Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political? at 135-36 (cited in note 104) (arguing
that diverse panels are more likely to follow the law correctly).
140 See, for example, 15 USC § 78d(a) (2000) ("Not more than three of [the five SEC] commissioners shall be members of the same political party.").
141 See id.
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the NLRA. ' It may be worth considering steps that would ensure
mixed panels on appellate courts, at least in high-stakes cases involving review of agency decisions for arbitrariness.
A more ambitious plan would enlist voting rules-by, for example, requiring unanimous decisions for invalidation of agency rulings
as arbitrary.' 3 We do not believe that our data support such a plan; the
extent of ideological voting cannot justify such a dramatic departure
from standard practices. But if unified panels are found, in the future,
to show highly ideological voting patterns, it would be important to
take steps to ensure that arbitrariness review does not amount, in
practice, to Democratic or Republican review.
CONCLUSION

In State Farm, the Supreme Court attempted to establish a framework that would check arbitrariness on the part of administrators who
are often given broad discretionary authority.'" Our principal goal
here has been to investigate the real world of arbitrariness review. We
have found that the validation rate for the NLRB and the EPA is 64
percent. This rate is remarkably close to the validation rate for similar
cases under Chevron.
The more important finding is that Democratic appointees show
a far higher rate of liberal voting than do Republican appointees: 69
percent as opposed to 55 percent. When agency decisions are liberal,
Democratic appointees are significantly more likely to vote to uphold
them than when they are conservative. By contrast, Republican appointees are significantly more likely to uphold conservative agency
decisions than liberal agency decisions. Democratic appointees show
especially liberal voting patterns when sitting on all-Democratic panels; Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns when sitting on all-Republican panels.
It follows that the political party of the appointing president is a
fairly good predictor of how a judge will vote in cases involving arbitrariness review; but the political party of the president who appointed
142 The Board's famous tendency to avoid rulemaking is noticed, with an evident lack of
enthusiasm, in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc v NLRB, 522 US 359,374 (1998) (noting that
the NLRB, "uniquely among major federal administrative agencies," has only adopted one regulation and otherwise promulgates rules entirely through adjudication).
143 See Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 Yale L J 676,
680 (2007) (arguing that requiring a unanimous panel decision would internalize deference and
maintain a constant level of deference over time).
144 Note that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act asks the secretary of transportation to issue standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle
safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15 USC § 1392(a), repealed by Pub L No 103-272
§ 7(b), 108 Stat 1379 (1994).
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the two other judges on the panel is also a strong predictor. These
conclusions might be taken to provide fresh support for those who
seek to soften arbitrariness review, or at least for those who seek to
reduce the role of judicial policy preferences in review of agency action. The hard look doctrine is most plausibly justified as a method for
controlling the exercise of open-ended authority by regulatory agencies.
To the extent that the doctrine operates, in practice, as a method of substituting judicial policy preferences for agency policy preferences, something is seriously wrong. Whether or not general softening is in order,
steps might be taken to reduce the risk that judicial policy preferences
are producing unjustified invalidations (and perhaps validations).
But our emphasis has been empirical, not normative. While the
differences between Republican and Democratic appointees are significant, most judicial votes are not driven by political convictions.
Recall that Republican appointees generally vote to validate liberal
agency decisions and that Democratic appointees generally vote to
validate conservative agency decisions. For this reason, it would be far
too simple to say that the hard look doctrine is operationalized in
purely political terms; our evidence is inconsistent with that conclusion. But it would not be too much to say that in important domains,
the hard look is hardened, or softened, by the political predilections of
federal judges.

